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1CHAPTER I
The Intent of the Act's Sponsors
and the Intent of Congress
The Robinson-Patman Act was passed by Congress-^ just five
years ago. If one could Judge the importance of a law by the
amount of discussion which it has caused on the part of busi-
nessmen, lawyers, and economists, the Robinson-Patman Act must
mean considerably more to lavj, economics, and business prac-
tices than most laws. Yet even a year after the Act became
effective, distinguished scholars could not agree as to the
seemingly simple question of the general purpose of the law.
Was it an act to preserve competition, as the majority report
contended, or was it a law to restrict competition, as the
minority report contended?^ Was it a legitimate amendment to
the Sherman Anti-trust Laws, or was it an anti-chain store
law slipped into the wrong category by a clever political
'Act of June 19, 1936, c.592; 49 Stat. 1526; U.S.. Code, Title
15, c.l, Sects. 13, 13a, 13b, 21a. Public 69ii, 74th Congress.
2Committee on Judiciary, H.R. Report 2287, to accompany H.R.
8442; 74th Congress. Part 1, Majority ReDort; part 2, minority
report
.

2At least some of the confusion surrounding the Act at the
time it was passed was due to the fact that the business man had
little understanding of the past interpretations of the highly
'^See, for example, E. P. Learner and Nathan Isaacs, "The Robin-
son-Pp.tman Lav;: Some Assumptions and Expectations." (Winter,
1957) 15 Harvard Business Review 137, at 139.
"Here we have obviously departed from the old philos-
ophy and tried to save men from the ravages of compe-
tition. But once more the draftsmen of the act have
been very adroit. They do not condemn in words the
injury of certain competitors. They still talk as if
the thing condemned is injury to competition. It is
unlawful to engage in price discrimination the effect
of v/hich may be to injure, destroy or prevent competi-
tion with certain persons. What is the difference
between hurting the corner grocer as an incident of
competition with the chain store and hurting his com-
petition with the chain? If the corner grocer must
lop five cents off the marked price of a c'^.n of peas
to meet competition, he is hurt, but is his competition
hurt within the meaning of the Act? If the answer is
yes, then the vjording of the statute is grossly mis-
leading. It is an anti-competitive statute slipped
into the anti-trust laws. And since it stops competi-
tion at the level where it is most effective in American
business, the only level where aggressive buying makes
inroads on fixed prices, it amounts to a repeal of the
a.nti-trust policy in a very import ?,nt part of American
business .
"
But see also in the same issue of the Harvard Business Review
at 156, a different view by Melvin T. Copeland, "The Problem of
Administering the Robinson-Patman Act."
Malcolm P. McNair "Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robins on-
Patraan Act" in Price Discrimination and Price Cutting
. 4 Lav: and
Contemporary Problems 334, June 1937 emphasizes the anti-chain
ancestry. In the same issue James Angell McLaughlin "The Courts
and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Construc-
tion," at p. 410 says the Act must be viewed in the light of the
Anti-trust Laws. Breck McAllister, "Price Control by Law in the

3technica.1 p.nti-trust literature, and the lawyer who dealt only
occasionally v^ith marketing -orobleins found it difficult to
answer ouestions about the legality of advertising allowances
and "push money."
Like many legal documents that carry much meaning, the
brevity of the law has no bea,ring on its significance. Like
4
the original Sherman Anti-trust Act
,
or the Constitution, the
meaning must be found not only in the past record lep^ding up to
the pas8a^.:e of the Act, but also the record of what has happened
since the Act went into effect.
Other reasons for the confusion in business circles at the
time the Act went into effect are not difficult to discover.
The Act began its life as an anti-chain store bill, and ended
up as an anti-price discrimination law, applying as much to its
friends and sponsors as to its foes. The Robinson-Patman Act
was designed as a weapon to be used by the so-called "regular"
or "orthodox" channels of distribution in their battle x-Jith the
newer "mass distributors." The older system of wholesaler-to-
independent-retailer v;as finding itself losing out in competi-
tion with the nex\Ter chains. Since the v/holesalers and retailers
were sure that they themselves could not be responsible for
'United States: A Survey" in the same issue, at 273 says
definitely at 289 that it is not an anti-trust law. Benjamin
Werne, in his Business and the Robinson Law: A Symposium
.
Oxford University Press, New York, 1933, holds that it is an
anti-trust la.w.
The Sherman Anti-trust Act covers one page; the cases decided
under it cover fifteen volumes.

4their loss of position, they convinced themselves and convinced
the legislators that the chains existed principally by virtue
of buying advantages. These buying advantages were to be taken
ax'jay by a lavj that would give the same price for "one twelfth
dozen" as for a carload, in the language of the less intelligent
sponsors
.
Because the sponsors of class lef-islation can never work
too directly to favor themselves or handicap their competitors.
It was necessary for them to aim at a politically acceptable
goal. As the Sherman Anti-trust Act has alvrays been eminently
respectable, whether enforced or not, the anti-chain store child
adopted the direct descendent of the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, as a TDroper parent. At the end of fifty years we have
almost no agreement as to ho\-j the original Sherman Act has
affected our economy; it is scarcely surprising, then, that an
amendment to an amendment to the Sherman Act v/as not crystal
clear. Because the leaders in the Wilson New Deal believed
that the courts had not carried out the intentions of the
Sherman Act, some of the work of enforcing fair competition
had been delegated to the new Federal Trade Commission. It
was unfortunate for the business man who must make decisions
immediately on prices that he could not know the meaning of
the nevj legislation until the Federal Trade Commission's atti-
tude was known. The past record of the Commission showed no
clear idea of a long range program, due probably to frequent

5changes in personnel and to frequent reversals by the courts.
If the business man and his lawyers were not sufficiently
impressed with the hazards of operating under the handicaps
mentioned, the recent death of the NRA forcibly reminded them
that the nation was not at all sure whether it did or did not
want competition as a regulator of economic activity. The NRA
and the anti-trust acts v/ere at opposite ends of the pole as
far as the underlying economic philosophies went, and to accept
one was to reject the other.
That the Robinson-Patman Act seems to have taken on a
fairly definite meaning in spite of the confusion in v^hich it
was surrounded is an indication that the sponsors of the Act
directly or indirectly aimed at a real evil, and that business
concerns have been willing to make drastic changes in their
whole marketing procedure when convinced that a basically
unfair situation had developed. That the Act has won the
respect of large sectors of American business is also a tribute
to a new spirit and a nev- st.andard of adjninistrat ive performance
For a study of the part played by the personalities see
E. Pendleton Herring, "The Federal Trade Commissioners" 8
g.ooT'ge Washington Lav^ Review 558. (Jan. Feb. Issue, 1940)
For a general treatment of the Federal Trade Commissions
Procedure, see Gerard C. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission
.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925; and Administrat ive
Procedures in Government Agencies . Part 6, Sen. Doc. 136,
76 Congress, 5rd Session.
For a study of the general effectiveness of the Federal Trade
Commission, see Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr. The Federal Trade
Commission: An Experiment in the Control of Business . New
York: Columbia University Press, 1952.

6by the Federal Trade Commission.
After five years of operation, we can fairly accurately
classify the Robinson-Pat man Act as an anti-price discrimina-
tion act. As such, it touches one special facet of the larger
problem of public regulation of market practices. It is im.pos-
sible to understand the special problem of control of price
discrimination without a broad sweep of the larger problem,
however brief that survey.
The corner stone in the law of trade regulation in the
QUnited States is the Sherman Act. If the Sherman Act had
accomplished its purpose of abolishing monopolies and restraints
of trade, the legislation of the Wilson New Deal, the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act,^ would have been
Two recent studies of the Sherman Act made for the Temporary
Nationa,l Economic Committee in its Investigation of Concentra-
tion of Economic Pov/er are by Walton H. Hp.railton, "Anti-trust
in Action" Monograph 15 and Milton Handler, "A Study of the
Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Anti-trust Laws."
Monograph 38. A comparison of even the first tv70 pages vrill
show the essential difference in the opinions of two authori-
ties associated with the present administration. Both agree
that the anti-trust laws have not succeeded; Hamilton raises
the question of a substitute and Handler believes we cannot
say the Act has failed until it has been enforced.
'^Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311; 38 Stat. 717; U.S. Code,
Title 15, c. 2, Sects. 41-51.
8Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323; 38 Stat. 730; U.S. Code,
Title 15, c.l. Sects. 12-27.

7unnecessary. Had the latter Acts worked out as their sponsors
hoped, the Robinson-Patman amendment would have been unnecessary.
The Sherman Act is based on the simple faith that if competition
is maintained, competition will itself do the trick of regulat-
ing our economy. To that problem we shall also direct our
attention.
The Robinson-Patman Act is only one of a number of legis-
lative enactments that have a common purpose, and stem from a
common cause. The Miller-Tydings Act (Price Maintenance)^ and
the various so-called Fair Trade Acts are not v:ithin the scope
of this article, exceDt incidentally. The various chain store
taxes will also enter only incidentally.
We are concerned, then, with a particular kind of regula-
tion of the market—a measure to control certain kinds of price
discrimination. To understand the causes of price discrimination,
the causes of an anti-price discrimination lav, and the probable
effects of the present lav:, it is necessary to review our pres-
ent marketing structure, with emphasis on the changes that have
taken place in the last fifty years.
Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act of August 17,
1957; 50 Stat. 693; U.S. Code, Title 15, c.l; Sect. 1; and
c. 2, Sect. 45.

8CHAPTER II
The Problem and Its Setting
A» The Decline of the Wholesaler.
Fifty years ago there vas in this country a fairly regular
or orthodox system of distribution built up to suit the needs of
the time. VHiile, a.s TeelelO points out, it is dangerous to over-
simplify the marketing set up, it probably is true that there
v:as a system of marketing which was reasonably uniform at least
in contrast with that of today. The manufacturer had not yet
arrived at the stage where he was particularly conscious of
"selling" problems; his job was to produce goods, for which a
rapidly expanding population seemed to provide an ever increas-
ing demand. The country and the small town retailer had neither
Stanley F. Teele, "Logics and Emotion in Marketing" in Busi-
ness and Modern Society
.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1953, P. 501.
"One of the Dronounced characteristics of present day
marketing is the degree to which familiar designations such
as wholesaler, retailer, broker, manufacturer's sales branches,
fail to describe institutions which as a class perform similar
functions. Widespread acceptance has been given, in this
country, to an altogether falla.cious belief that there once
existed a simple and sound oattern from which we have deviated
with unfortunate results. According to this notion, the 'natural'
or 'normal' marketing oat tern involved the movement of goods
from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer, with certain
groups of functions definitely assigned to each of these links
in the chain.
"...This simple pattern was never characteristic of all market-
ing. Many years ago the grocery, drug, and hardware trades
were known as the Jobbing trades thereby distinguishing them
from other trades in which the use of wholesalers was less
universal."

9the time, the knov:ledge nor the inclination to hunt up the
manufacturers from whom he could buy his goods, nor could the
manufacturer be bothered with selling in small lots. The whole-
saler, as the buying agent for the small retailer, performed a
useful function for which he was rewarded accordingly.-^^ The
problem of the retailer was how to secure goods which his cus-
tomers could buy. The wholesaler v/as the only agent who had a
knowledge of "sources" of goods. The wholesaler frequently
purchased the entire output of a mill, put on his own label,
a.nd sold to the retailer enough for a full years supply.
In this simple market structure, selling problems usually
did not exist. Even the depa.rtraent stores. Just beginning to
enter the picture at this time, called the head of a department
the buyer , not the salesmanager .
The first blow to the wholesaler came with the develop-
ment of mass production techniques which made it possible to
produce more goods than were immediately demanded by the buyers.
At first, the manufacturer satisfied himself by seeking out the
wholesalers, instead of waiting for the wholesaler to come to
him, but even that was not enough to move the ever increasing
volume of goods .produced by his mass production factories. The
See David R. Crs.ig and \'Jerner G-abler, "The Competitive Struggle
for Market Control" in Marketing: in our American Economy
. 209
Annals American Academy Political and Social Science, 84,
(May 1940)

10
manufacturers began going direct to the retailer for part of
their goods, and around the turn of the century, the manufactur-
) ers began taking their products direct to the consumer through
advertising their own brands. Here entered two important factors
in the decline of the v/holesaler—the branding of goods by the
manufacturer and the tendency of the manufacturer to go direct
to the retailer or even to the consumer without passing through
the wholesaler. As long as the retailer's customer asked for a
bar of soap, the wholesaler serving this retailer could buy his
soap from v/hom he pleased; but when the customer insisted on
Pear's Soap , the v;holesaler had to buy only from the manufacturer
of Pear'
s
. The wholesaler's importance and independence declined.
The automobile brought with it great changes, practically
all for the worse as far as the wholesaler was concerned. These
changes affected the retailer as well. Consumers began to shop
over a wider geographical area, so that comparisons of price
and quality v:ere easier. The larger stores in the buying cen-
ters found themselves large enough to buy from the manufacturer
direct, and the small town customer v:as getting so particular
about the fashion she wore, because she travelled more than
she did before the auto came into her life, that she refused
to buy the "fashions" the wholesaler had sold to the retailer
in last year's order. The x-^holesaler, then, was not doing too
well for himself.

11
B. Changes in the Retail Market.
Both the wholesaler and the retailer were greatly affected
by the changes in branding a.nd the changes in the xfider geo-
graphical shopping area, but these changes were small compared
with the cha.nges yet to come—the entry of"mass distributors."
The first mass distributor w?.s the department store; the mail
order houses follov/ed; then, came the chain. Because the First
Census of Distribution was not taken until 1929, vie have no
reliable figures as to the dates on which each of these units
became a serious threat to the "orthodox" or "regular channels"
and because the influence of the low cost distributor extended
far beyond the business he actually took from the villa,ge store.
The "monopoly power" of the village store was partly taken away
when the catalogues of Sears Roebuck or Montgomery Ward made it
Dossible for the village store's customer to compare prices.
The question of vjhether brands have increased or decreased .
competition has not yet been completely answered, but as far as
the small retailer was concerned, the answer was very positively
yes . If his customer believed that John Smith's sausage x-:as
superior to that of the meat market dovm the block, where sau-
sage was five cents less, John Smith could say that he sold a
higher quality sausage. If both sausages carried the same
brand, the area of price comDetition widened. More emphasis
was placed on price comparisons by the customer, causing more
price competition among retailers. Because of the current
emphasis on the decline of competition, we are apt to overlook
those fields in which competition increased. One of the best

12
students of this field, E. T. G-rether, believes the increase
in price competition between the different retailers is the
12
main cause of the resort to the law for help.
The chain store probably had its greatest period of growth
from the end of the V/orld War to 1929. Nothing much was done in
See Ewald T. G-rether, Price Control Under Fair Trade Legisla-
t ion . Oxford University Press, 1959. G-rether discusses the
Robinson-Patman Act only incidentally, but his treatment is
one of the best available. See especially Chap. IX, "The Play
of Interests In Retailing" P. 225-55. He refers to the causes
of price maintenance legislation in r)articular in the follow-
ing Quotation from p. 231, but much the same causes are respon-
sible for both types of price control laws.
"The growth in importance of powerful brands of goods
sharpened much of retail competition by focussing it upon
identical goods betx^'een stores, by increasinr the returns
from leader strategy in merchandising, and by reinforcing
the other Influences making for vrider retail selling radii
and larger volume of sales per store. But there is still
opTDortunity for considerable product differentiation between
retail shops because there is as yet no marked brand domi-
nance in nost lines. Further, the full impact of the growth
of well-known brands upon retail competition may be offset
by price uniformity between stores. The standardization of
prices on identical goods makes for a wider diffusion of the
retail business with narrower selling radii and small sales
per store. The desire to produce this effect provides the
incentive for the small dep.lers who are pushing for resale
price maintenance on trade marked goods,"

13
the xiray of resort to the legislature by its opponents until
1927, when Maryland enacted the first sta.te chain store tax,
^ which along with similar tax measures enacted by G-eorgia,
South Carolina and North Carolina, was declared unconstitution-
al. ^'^ Not until 1931 vras the first chain store tax upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in State Board v Jackson.
It is no doubt true, as summarized by the Twentieth Century
Committee on Distribution in its excellent study Does Distribu-
tion Cost Too Much?^^ that
"At times it might almost be said that particular
groups become effective in politics to the degree that
they lose effectiveness in business."
C. The Decline in Economic Strength and the Rise of the
Political Povjer of the Independent.
To understand ,both the loss of economic effectiveness, and
the gain of political power, a reviev- of a few figures will be
helpful. It is important to understand at the outset that in
spite of the revolution in distribution, the so-called orthodox
channel of manufacturer-to-wholesaler-to-retailer is still the
dominant form, not only in overwhelming superiority of numbers,
but also in total volume of business transacted. The best
See authorities collected by G-eorge J. Feldman, "Legislative
Barriers to Chain Stores and its Minimization" in G-overnment3.1
Market Barriers 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 334, Soring
1941.
^^283 U.S. 527 (1931).
l^New York, 1939. See page 247.

14
"guesses"—a.nd only guesses seem available until the final
figures of the 1939 Census are available—tell us that approxi-
I mately fifty per cent of all retail sales follow this channel.
16
No other single channel approaches that percentage. For
purposes of general analysis, it is safer at this moment to
use the more complete figures of the Census of 1935 and the
Census of 1939, but a quick review of the incomplete figures
for the Census of 1939 seems profitable.
See, for inst^-.nce, Al'?xander and others. Marketing . Boston:
Ginn and Company, 194o . Chap. 14, P. 373.
Paul D. Converse and Harvey W. Huegy, Elements of Marketing
.
New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940.
Does Distribution Cost Too Much . P. 7S, op. cit.

15
Selected Flgures -^'^
1939 Census of Distribution
Type of Operation No. of Stores Sales. 1959 Per Cent
Total 1,770,355 42,041,790,000 100
Independents 1,624,635 31,409,859,000 74.7
Chains 123,195 9,105,825,000 21.7
Other types 22,495 1,526,106,000 3.6
Changes in Percentage. 1939. 1935. 1929
by Types of Operation
Type of Operation Per Cent Total Sales
1939 1935 1929
Total 100 100 100
Independents 74.7 73.3 77". 6
Chains 21.7 23.3 20.3
Other types 3.6 3.4 2.1
Note : All figures on chains and independent stores should be
read x^rith the definitions of the Census Burea.u in mind:
" Independents . The chief characteristic of this classi-
fication is that these stores are local, individual enter-
prises, usually, but not always, "o^'jner operated," For
purposes of classification in this census, three or fewer
stores under one management -ovmership have been classi-
fied as independents.
Chains. The chief characteristic of this classification
is that these stores are groups of four or more in the
same genera.l kind of business owned and operated Jointly
with central buying, usually supplied from one or more
central warehouses. The number of stores includes each
Industrial Reference Service . April 1941. Business Series 3
Sixteenth Census of United States, Release of April 16, 1941
U.S. Department of Commerce.

16
retail establishment and is not a count of the number
of chain store groups. Neither does it include the
warehouse nor central buying offices maintained apart
from the stores. Usually the operation of each store
f is in the hands of a manager who is not identified as
an owner. Central advertising and personnel policies
are frequently other characteristics of chain opera-
tions
.
Other Tyoes . These other types may involve some of the
characteristics of independents or chains but are segre-
gated because they represent important methods of retail
distribution. Among the principal types are utility-
operated stores, direct selling (house to house), State
liquor stores, and mail-order houses."
A very brief analysis of these figures will show that the
indeoendent retailers increased frora/^455,054 units in 1935 to
1,624,635 units in 1939—an increase of 139,611 units over a
five-year period. The chains, on the other hand, decreased
from 131,430 in 1935 to 123,195 in 1939, or a decrease in five
years of 8,235 units. What is more important is the fact that
the chains decreased their percentage of total retail sales
from 23.3 per cent in 1935 to 21.7 per cent in 1939. Whether
this decrease means that the trend of business towards the
chain has been reversed, the evidence will not permit us to
say without further study and until more years have passed.
It should be noticed that the chains are doing a larger per-
centage of the tot.al retail sales than they were doing in
1929. The decline in the number of outlets can be explained
almost entirely by the tendency towards fewer and la.rger stores,
a policy forced on the chains by the newest competitor, the
super-ma.rket and by chain store taxes bc.sed on the number of
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H
units in the chain.
In connection vrith the figxires given by the Census of
P Distribution, several caveats are important. In the first
place, the per cent of total retail sales done by chains does
not necessa.rily correspond vrith the amount done by what the
"independents" in the political sense regard as their enemies
—
the "mass distributors." Some extremely large organizations,
notably the independently owned super-markets are rightly
classed as independents; an independently owned super-market
may actually offer stiffer competition to the corner grocer
The "oreliminary figures give some interesting material on
the distribution of chain stores by states. It might be
interesting to note that the greatest legislative opposition
to chains seems to be coming from those states in which the
growth of the chain is comparatively recent. Massachusetts
and Mississippi show respectively 26.3 per cent and 10.
S
per cent of total retail business done by chains. The thickly
populated states like Massachusetts have been comparatively
free from strong opposition to chain stores. See Ind. Ref .
Ser
. . op, cit., P.2« Compare v/ith State Distribution of Chain
Stores in the studies by the Federal Trade Commission. Senate
Document 130, 73 Congress 2d session. It would seem fair to
say that the leadership in the anti-chain movement has come
largely from those states in v/hich the chains are weakest.
1928 Distribution of Chain Stores Per 100.000 Population
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Massachusetts,
22.2 7.6 15.1 21,9 20.9 106.2
New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Michigan
83.4 110,4 78 76,4
Note: Selected at random from Federal Trade Study above.
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than the corporate chain next door. A separate report on the
supermarket is in preparation by the Census Bureau at the pres-
ent time. Perhaps a more important failing is in the lack of
figures on non-corporate chains, the voluntaries and the coopera-
19
tlves. The voluntary chains are the groups of stores who
achieve some of the advantages of the corporate chains by doing
most or all of their buying through one wholesale house; sales
helps of various kinds are usually part of the program of both
voluntary and cooperative chains. The form of organization may
be almost as rigid as that of a corporate chain, or as loose as
the traditional independent store. The voluntary chains are
dominated by the independent wholesaler who organized the group
as a means of saving both himself and the retail dealers on
whom he depended for existence. The coopera.tive chain, on the
other hand, was organized by a group of retailers, v:ho may or
may not organize their own wholesale house. The estimates of
the amount of business done by this importa.nt type of chain
are especially untrustworthy because the organizations are
changing all the time. It is probably safe to say that all of
the non-corporate chains put together do not sell as much goods
as the la.rgest corporate chain—the A&P, The 1959 Census
For sources on the voluntary and cooperative chains, see
especially Does Distribution Cost Too Much , op. cit. 85 to 87.
Converse, Elements of Marketing , op. cit., 401 ff.
Alexander, Marketing
. 362 to 375 gives one of the best short
accounts and gives an excellent bibliography.
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figures on this type of organization will give the only relia.ble
estimates on this subject. The "voluntaries" \-jere originally
I
formed to fight the chains but at the present time it is impos-
sible to say whether the voluntaries are more like the traditional
independents or more like the corporate chains. Some interesting
developments in this field will bear watching.
The essential problem of the chain versus independent
battle is summarized in two figures t?.ken from the nev; census:
the average sales volume of the independent retailer in 1939
was $19,3(53, The average sales of one unit in the chain was
almost four times as high, or $73,914.
For further analysis of the littleness and bigness problem
in distribution, we must go to figures older than the 1939
census, for the reason that not enough of the 1939 figures are
available a.s yet. However, enough figures for 1939 are avail-
able to show that the analysis would not be changed in any
significant degree.
For the problem of littleness in retailing, one of the
on
best studies is that of Paul T. Cherington.'^^
"In this country most of the discussion of operating
scale in recent years has been concerned with the
dangers of operating business on too big a scale...
But in retail distribution the real menace is the
da.nger of allowing business to be too small to pay
y
^OSee his article "Economic Aspects of Some Recent Trade
Legislation" in Werne, op. cit
.
, at 26-39.
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the going rate for managerial brains out of the normal
mark-up, "21
"The small merchant is obviously a convenieno 3 to the
public in many Instances, but he costs money. Hov; much
he represents in the notoriously excessive cost of mer-
chandise distribution never has been pointed out adequate-
ly. Until recently, we have had no figures to show vjhat
he did in rela.tion to x^7hat he cost. But from the three
sets of figures collected by the Census of 1930, 193?,
1935, some ideas about these tvro phases of the small
merchant can be deduced. "22
There were, counting independents, chains, mail-order
houses, 1,654,948 stores in 1935. Of this number, 76.7 per
cent, or over one million two hundred thousand stores, did less
than twenty thousand dollars in total volume per year. Chering
ton believes that over a oeriod of time, it is difficult to
make a profit of over two per cent. Two per cent of !^20,000
gives the retailer only '3400 per year, or less than eight
dollars per week. Since it is impossible for these one million
two hundred thousand retailers to make a living on a normal
profit of four hundred dollars per year, Cherington thinks
either of two things must happen; either we allow a million
families to live at less than a decent standard, or we pay
far more tha.n the two per cent that seems to be the required
^^Ibid, at 31 p. 34
22i-bi^, p. 31.
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normal profit to keep distributors on the job serving the
public. In either ca.se, the results are economically bad^
Cherington thinks it v/as quite natura.1 for the small
retailer to attempt to raise his pay by an appeal to the
legislators, Just as the laboring man, the fa.rraer and almost
everyone else seemed to be doing, but before discussing the
small retailer's resort to the legislature, it is necessary
to contrast the problem of bi^ ness in retailing.
.
.and that is
another story.
It is almost impossible to overemphasize the problem of
littleness in retailing. While there may be some question
as to whether Cherington is allowing too low a per cent of
profit (See, for instance, the profit figures of all dis-
tributive compa.nies whose stocks are listed on the oublic
stock exchanges in Survey of Americr.n Listed CorDorat ions .
Compiled from records of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Volume II, June 1939.) His analysis is supported by
other authorities. See Alexander a.nd others, op. cit.
P. 399. Alexander develops an Interesting point on the non-
economic reasons for survival of inefficient units of dis-
tribution. Converse, Elements of Marketing discusses the
same problem on P. 302. The Twentieth Century Committee
on Distribution has found the same situation. See Does
Distribution Cost Too Much , op, cit. Chapts. 4,5, and 10.
The committee's estimate on profits is exactly the sme as
Cherington' s. See P. 355.
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D. "Bigness" in Distribution.
Even though the number of units too small for economic
efficiency creates a real problem, it is by no means to be
argued from that fact that there is no problem of bigness.
While 76.7 per cent had less than |20,000 in sales per year,
and accounted for only 23 per cent of total retail sales, 20.8
24per cent of all sales were made by a handful of only 8,444
stores doing business of $300,000 per yef.r and over—a mere
half of one per cent of the stores sold 20 per cent of the
total.
In the period before the start of the strong agitation
against the chain stores, the chain stores gained at a startling
25
rate. Congress in its first resolution asking the Federal
Trade Commission to report on the dangers of monopoly present
in the sudden grov;th of the chains, reported that the per cent
of total retail business had increased from 4 per cent in 1920
to 16 per cent in 1927. Whether these figures were correct or
not we have no absolute method of checking, because the census
figures previous to 1929 did not show much of anything on dis-
tribution trends, but we do know that the 4 per cent figure is
'^'^Cherington, op. cit., P. 31.
^^Senate Resolution 224, 70th Congress. Quoted in Final Report
) of The Chain Store Investigation . Federal Trade Commission,
1935, 74th Congress, Senate Document number 4.
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accepted by the spokesman for the chain stores, and the census
of 1929 shov:ed 20.3 per cent of all retail business going through
the chains. It is estimated that from five to seven billion
27
dollars worth of foods are sold each year. VThile the largest
chain, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, did only
5?194,647,000 in 1919, by 1929 its sales had risen to over one
billion dollars, or almost one sixth of all food sales for the
entire United States. The five largest chains, the MP, Kroger,
American Stores, Safeway, and First National did less than a
half billion in 1922, but did almost two billion of the $7.3
billion food sales in 1929. The five largest chains did over
a third of the business in food—the largest and most essential
field of retailing.
26
John P. Nichols, The Chain Store Tells Its Story . New York
Institute of Distribution, 1940 Edition. See ep-oecially
Chap. 4, "The Chain Store Legislative Problem," 127. This
annual publication, x^^hile written frankly from a partisan
point of view, not only expresses the vievj of the chain store
group, but also includes much material not easily located
elsewhere
.
^"^For an excellent factual study of the effect of the chains on
food distribution, see A.C. Hoffman, Chief Agricultural
Economist, Department of Agriculture, Largre Sc^.le Organiza-
tion in the Food Industries . This is a Monograph prepared
for the Temporary National Economic Committee in its Investi -
gation of Concentration of Economic Power . Washington, 1940,
See Chap. 2, "Mass Retailing of Food Products," P. 8. Hoffman
is very favorably inclined toward the chain stores. Some of
his historical material is subject to challenge, but the mat-
erial is generally good. Quoted hereafter as TNEC Monograph
35.
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In TDoint of number of outlets, as contrasted with total
sales, the figures again are indicative of giant organizations.
As early as 1924 the A&P had 11,421 stores, and reached a high
of 15,757 in 1950. Safeway had 5,564 stores in 1956, while
Kroger had 4,212."'° It is interesting to note that since 1950
A&P has been reducing the number of its stores to take advantage
of the "supermarket" organization begun during the depression
by independents, and developed by them into a real rival to the
chains.'" Where the average retail establishment in 1959 sold
a volume of $19,555, the average unit in the A&P chain sold over
$95,000 in 1959. The average for the A&P in 1952 wasv%6,569
per store, but where the A&P had 15,427 stores in 1952, it had
reduced that number to 10,250 in 1959. Safeway had the terrific
volume of ^129,250 per store in 1959.
28
A. C. Hoffman, Monograph 55, op. cit., P. 6. The official
title of the A&P is The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Ce-
lts popular name vill be used because it is more descriptive.
29
For a late summary on the supermarket develooment, see M.M.
Zimmerman "The Supermarket and the Gha.nging Retail Structure",
5 Journal of Marketing 402 .April 1941. Starting as a depres-
sion phenomena in 1952, when King Cullen introduced the super-
market in the East, the supermarket has developed so fast that
Zimmerman estimates a business of two billion dollars was done
in 1940. There were 5,501 independent operators and 2,769
chain units, including 1,540 operated by A&P. The census
bureau ha.s not yet relep.sed its figures on the supermarket,
but more exact figures are promised by the census bureau
before 1941 is over.
50
All figures from Poors Industry and Investment Survey,
G-rocery Chains, B February 4, 1941.
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That this tendency towards concentration of the distribu-
tive trades was not confined to the food line is shown, to take
only a random illustration, in the $166,514,110 sales of the
giant mail-order house of Sea.rs Roebuck, which had grown to
^268,731,794 in 1927.^^
Year Sales
1934 £318,000,000
1933 $501,677,000^2
1940 $704,301,014(New York Times cllpping)*^*^
The New York Times for Sunday, April 13, 1941, carried a list
of some of the important Department stores. Specialty shops.
Mail Order, and Chain stores. This list is by no means complete,
as it le8,ves out the largest chain, the A&P which had sales of
$1,115,774,000 according to the New York Times, July 7, 1941,
—
the highest in the history of any chain. This list v/ith the
addition of only the A&P would show a total of almost six billion
dollars, or about one seventh of all retail sr.les in the United
States in the hands of sixty-seven companies
.
31Quoted in Edmund P. Learned, Problems in Marketing . New York:
McGraw Hill, 1936, P. 579.
32
Survey of American Listed Corporations, op. cit, at Table ix.
The most recent treatment of the problem of concentration
in the distributive trades is that of Reinhold P. V7olf,
"Monopolistic Competition in Distribution" in Governmental
Barriers to Distribution . 8 Law and Contemporary Problems
503, S-oring, 1941.
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To put the problem of bigness in another way, take the statement
from Hoffman.^ To contrast the picture of bigness and littleness
in the retail trades one could, for instance, say that the 41.2
per cent of the total number of retail establishments v/ho do less
than a volume of $5,000 a year accounted for only $1,479,225,000
—
or less than the sales of two large chains—Sears Roebuck and
A&P, But further demonstration is superfluous.
E. The Resort to the Legislature.
During the 1920 's when the chains were gaining raoidly,
it was inevitable that some of the older forms of distribution
should suffer loss of business. Not only did the older units
lose the amount of business done by the chains, which was sub-
stantial, but they also were forced to come nearer to meeting
Hoffman, op. cit., TNEC, Monograph 35, p. 11.
"The contrast between the mass distributor and the tra-
ditional independent grocer so f-^.r as size of the store unit is
concerned is illustrated by the following comparison: To do
1 per cent of the total grocery business of the United States
it takes on the average 429 stores of the supermarket type,
1,170 corporate chp.in stores, 4,000 voluntary chain units, and
more than 10,000 unafiliated independent stores. In other words,
the average supermarket has a volume business of nearly twenty-
five times that of the average independent, while the average
corpora.te chain unit is nine times as large."
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the lower prices of the chains to keep v/hat business they could.
When the depression reduced the total volume of retail sa.les
from forty nine billion in 1929 to thirty three billion in 1933,
the shoe really pinched. Judging purely by results, the ortho-
dox distributors seemed to be losing the battle on the economic
front; but they had the benefit of numbers on the political front,
and they were under pressure to do something about it at a time
when it was common for all groups to appeal to the government for
a law to make things right.
If the small retailers and v;holesalers made use of political
pressure to bring the forces of government to their side of the
fight, we need not be surprised, for history gives us Dlenty of
precedents for similar action by others. And if the final result
was not exactly what the group planned and hoped for, we still
have plenty of evidence that the same thing has often happened
before. As McNair points out:
"...government having to an increasing extent
abandoned its impartial role of umpire in favor of
partisan interference, small retailers, aware of the
tariff favors bestowed on manufacturers in previous years
and more recently observing the benefits distributed to
farmers, have nov; organized themselves to exert pressure
with a view to making their own economic position more
comfortable. Of course it goes without saying that these
seekers of advantage march boldly forv^ard v^ith good con-
science under the banners of public welfare. "'^^
35McNair, "Marketing Functions and the Robinson-Pat man Act"
op. cit., 355
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or to quote a.pB.ln from Does Distribution Cost Too Much :
"Most laws discussed in this chapter came out
of the changing fortunes of competitive groups. At
times it might almost be said that particular groups
become effective in politics to the degree that they
lose effectiveness in business . "'^^
Before reading the story of the Robinson-Patraan Act's
travels through the halls of Congress, it would be well to con-
37
sider the suggestion of G-rether:
"Throughout the United States in the past few
years legislators h-ve been busy placing restrictions
upon competition in the marketing of commodities. Among
the nev/ regulations of trade practices none are so pot-
entially significant as those relating to price competi-
tion. Almost invariably these new laws, when they were
emitted from the legislative hoppers, bore descriptive
titles such as 'Fair TradeAct,' 'Unfair Practices Act,'
•Fair Sales Act,' 'Unfair Sales Act,' ^Unfair Competi- '
tion and Discriminp.t ion act.' As a consequence of this
use of descriptive adjectives to identify statutes con-
fusion has arisen concerning the purposes and content
of the various enactments... Under these circumstances,
in order to avoid confusing the citizen further, it would
a.ppear sound law in the future either to forbid descrip-
tive titles or to establish a central federal bureau of
registration for statutory titles similar to that for
the registration of trade marks."
op. cit., p. 247.
2'^Ewald T. Grether, Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation
.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1S39, P.
3
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The life of the Rob inson-Patman Act before it became the
33law of the land on June 19, 1936, is worth repeating not only
because it is necessary to know the Act's history to make any
sense out of its words, but also because it typifies much pressure
legislation by economic groups. Congress had begun an investiga-
tion of the American Retail Federation to determine, among other
things, whether C. 0. Sherrill, its president, was paid $50,000
39
a year "to gather statistics." The Committee found that it
was orgp.nized supposedly as a spokesman for the independent mer-
chants, but was financed by the chain and department stores.
One of the moving spirits in the investigation was Congressman
Patraan of Texas. When the leaders of the United Wholesalers
Grocers Association wanted to introduce a bill written by their
legislative counsel, Judge H.B. Teegarden, Congressman Patman
40
was the most likely sponsor. The V/holesalers were desirous
38
See Footnote 1.
'^^Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1st Session, P. 8104-8106.
40Benjamin Werne, Business and the Robinson -Patman Law . Oxford
University Press, 1938, Wheeler Sammons, Legislative History .
Pp. 99-131.
Benton A. Zorn and George J. Feldman, Business Under the New
Price Laws . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937, Chax). IV,
P. 46.
See also Investigations of Concentration of Economic Power
.
Monograph 26, Economic Power and Political Pressure . P. 181.
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of putting into law a provision of the N»R.A. (just killed by
the nine Old Men) which would have helped to restore the whole-
saler to his former importance by a device that almost tended
to make it necessary for every retailer to buy through a whole-
saler, instead of direct from the manufacturer. Obviously this
"functional discount" clause would penalize the retailer, but
the support of the small retailers was secured by emphasizing
the "effect on the chains." When the bill was reported to the
house by Judge Utterbeck"^^ he explained the purpose:
"The purpose of this proposed legislation is to
restore, so far as possible, equality of opportunity
in business by strengthening anti-trust laws and by
protecting trade and commerce against unfair trade
practices and unlax^^ful price discrimination, and also
restraint and monopoly for the better protection of
consumers, workers, and independent producers, manu-
facturers, merchants, and other business men. "42
In his majority report. Judge Utterbeck ouotecj., among other
materials, the findings of the Federal Trade Commission's inves-
tigation of the chain store, "^"^ the G-oodyear Case.'^'^
Report of Mr. Utterbeck, Cora, on Judiciary to accomoany
H.R. 8442-H.R. Report 2287, Serial 9993, amends sec. 2 of
Act of Act 15, 194
42
Ibid, P.
3
"^^Final Report of the Chain Store Investigation . Federal Trade
Commission. 74th Cong. Sen. Doc. #4, 19, filed Dec. 14, 1934.
Published 1935, made in response to Senate resolution 224,70
Congress. Hereinafter cited as Final Chain Store Report .
^^Matter of Goodyear Tire and Rubber . Federal Trp.de Commission,
Docket 2116, March 5, 1936, 22 F.T.C. 232, hereinafter cited
as Goodyear Case
.
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He also quoted the "Economist's Committee on Anti-trust Policy."
The viords of Judge Utterbeck have been quoted and quoted again
to show what the Act means.
Apparently Mr. Utterbeck' s interpretation was not the only
possible interpretation, for another member of the sr.me Committee,
45Mr. Celler, in his Minority Report believed the purpose should
be "to destroy equality of opportunity in business, weaken the
anti-trust law, create a monopoly." Celler particularly objected
to including the list of economists who favored enforcement of
the anti-trust laws— (the majority report did not say that these
economists favored the Patman Bill, but if the new Bill was part
of the anti-trust laws, would they not endorse it, too?)—and
showed telegrams from scores of these economists who professed
no opinion or a negative opinion on the nevj Bill. Mr. Celler,
incidentally, quotes Henry Ford:
"There is no way to limit competition. It is
something that either is or is not. Barring competi-
tion is only a way of bringing in price fixing, and
price fixing is not only the refuge of the inefficient
man, but also a stone wall across the path of progress.
Of course, if that goes under the name of competition
it is not competition, but racketeering. The competi-
tion of quality and service is the only competition
worthy of the name... I\Tien government enters largely into
industry or distribution, or into any of the elements
that go to make up our lives, competition is replaced by
regulation... Since reg-ulation must bar competition, and
directly or indirectly fix trices, everything that is
obsolete will be preserved and nothing that means prog-
ress will be allowed. "^^
^^H.R. Report 2287, Part 2, to accompany H.R. 8442. April 8, 1936.
^^Ibid. P. 9.
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But like his colleague's majority report, Celler fails to say
whether or not the authority he quoted had the Patraan Bill in
mind. But the Patman Bill as reported by Judge Utterbeck was
considerably modified when the House and Senate got through
V7ith it. Incidentally, the "functional discount" of its original
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sponsors was lost in the process.
The Act as passed by Congress, then, was not the bill
sponsored by the '//holesale CS-rocers Association to help them
retain or regain their "place in the sun. "48 But the Act as
written could still.be interpreted as a weapon for the old style
distributors, if interpreted in a one-sided manner. This takes
us to a study of the Act as enforced by the Federal Trade Com-
mission.
'^'^See Conf. Report, June 8, 1936. H.R. Report 2951.
^^That the policy of rushing to the legislature for aid when an
established industry is challenged by a newer industry is an
old, old, story is illustrated by the following quotation from
Abbot Payson Usher's An Introduction to the Industrial History
of England . Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1920, at P. 280
"Parliament in England was accessible to almost any suggestion
that an established industry wr.s endangered. The English protec-
tive system, therefore, was specifically designed to protect
vested interests: it was directed against the great transforma-
tion of habits of consumption brought about by the trade with
India."
Calico Act of 1721 : "An act to preserve and encourage the
woolen and si]k manufacturers and for the more satisfactory
employment of tne poor, by prohibiting the use and wear of
all printed, painted, flowered or dyed calicoes in apparel,
household stuffs, furniture or otherwise. The act made it
unlawful for any person to use or wear any calicoes under
penalty of forfeiting five pounds to the informer and Daying
a fine of 20 pounds. Merchants vrere not allowed to sell any
calicoes, or any furniture upholstered with calicoes."
See Usher at 284,285.
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'For the attitude that one is to be protected in his trade
from competition, see the application of the Statute of
Apprentices .Lioson. Economic History of England
. London: Black 1931
Part 3, P. 279 ff.
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CHAPTER III
The Act As Interpreted by the Federal Trade Commission
In the First Five Years
That an Act vrith so varied a history would need Interpreta-
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tlon, Is self-evident. As Copeland said in 1937:
"What this legislation will accomplish hinges largely
on how the Act is administered by the Federal Trade Com-
mission. It can remain practically a dead letter, like
many another law on our state and federal statute books;
it can be a.dminist ered in a narrov^, vacillating manner, so
as to become a nuisance to business and of little benefit
to the public; or it can be handled in a broad, construc-
tive manner beneficial alike to business and to the public."
In answer to the question raised by Copeland, as to whether
the Act xvould be administered in a "narrow, vacillating manner,"
as to whether it v;ould be enforced only against the mass distribu-
tors, Edwin B. George expressed the belief of many when he said:
"For our mental satisfaction, we can continue
to be irritated with a law that in spirit Just fell
short of being fanatical; in fidelity to the tradition
of American business, we may find a way to extract the
good that is in the Act. "50
Melvin T. Copeland, "The Problem of Administering the Robinson-
Patman Act," 15 Harvard Business Review 156, (Winter, 1937)
'George's article, "The Robinson-Patman Act Begins to Acquire
Meaning," 48 Dun's Review 20, March 1940, is one of the most
comprehensive surveys of the effects of the Act.
For another good review, see also Paul D. Converse, "What the
Roblnson-Patman Act is Doing to Quantity Selling" 34 Advertising
and Selling 31, January 1941; Benjamin Werne, "Three Years of
the Robinson-Patraan Act: Federal Trade Commission Invokes
Every Phase and Wins Every Appeal." 189 Printer's Ink 21,
December 8, 1939. The Robinson-Patman Guide Book prepared by
the staff of the American Institute of Food Distribution, Inc.,
420 Lexington Avenue, Mew York, 1940, is perhaps the best
general guide to the application of the Act to various busi-
ness practices.
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The difficulties of enforcing the Act have been truly
colossal; almost every business in the United States was affected
in one way or another by some transactions that fell within the
Act, To quote from the same article of George's:
"In the slow unfolding of the Robinson-Patman Act
we have been favored with a new variety of Arctic night.
The six-months show put on by Nature each year, great and
venerable though its fame, seems merely puney in compari-
son with the nigh onto four years of darkness in which
one of our major laws has been shrouded. Yet through it
all, the lifting process has been steady... There is no
blame on that score to be laid at the doors of either the
administrative agency or the courts. The job was tremen-
dous. It was on the striking scale that so often accompanies
any effort to impose an apparently simple but rigid idea on
the immensity and variety of business. In this case the
idea—that of keeping price discrimination within reason-
able bounds—had to be given a half dozen radically differ-
ent forms to keep the most commonplace practices from frus-
trating it at the very outset of "its life,.. We certainly
have had nothing like the sweeping changes in the system
of distribution that some of the more fanatical supporters
of the measure hoped for, but neither do we have the same
liberty and license in pricing policies that the violent
opponents regarded as sacred. In its own staggering way
the law as it has come out of the Judicial assembly plant
has followed the middle of the road."51
Both G-eorge and Copeland appreciate the importance of
proper administration of the Act. The Act itself is not self-
enforcing, except incidentally through a seldom-used provision
that gives an injured party the right to sue for triple damages.
Neither is it enforced primarily by the executive branch of the
government. (For purposes of this study, the so-called Borah-
Van Nuys Act, the criminal section, can be disregarded. There
is no record of any action having been taken on this section
in the five years.) The enforcement of the Act is in the hands
51^
Idem.
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of the Federal Trade Commission, under a form of procedure all
its own.
IrVhen the Commission has some evidence that a violation of
the Act has taken place, either because of a letter or other
form of communication from a customer or a competitor who
believes he has a cause for compHaJnt, or because the Commission,
on its own motion, desires an investigation, the Chief Examiner
goes over the preliminary material. If he believes the preliminary
matter satisfies all requirements for a complaint, the Chief
Examiner sends the application to the nearest field office for
investigation by a staff member, who is usually an accountant or
an attorney. These field offices are located in New York, Chicago,
Seattle, San Francisco, Nex\f Orleans, and the main office at Wash-
ington. The field investigator goes direct to the company or
individual against whom the complaint has been made, and discusses
informally the charges and the defense. A report is given to the
field office, and by the field office to Washington. The investi-
gator may interview competitors in the trade or customers to
see whether competition has been injured, whether the practice
is common to the trade, and secure any other information helping
to complete the picture. Many a case goes no further. If a com-
plaint is issued, the company may either agree to the facts, or
ask for a hearing before a trial examiner. The report of the
examiner is reviev/ed by the Commission before final action is
taken. If the company believes its rights have been infringed
upon an appea.1 may be taken to the Circuit Courts.
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In all of the procedure, a vjide degree of Judgment is called
for. The Commission may issue a complaint every time a letter
from a crank comes in, it may cause a fight over non-essential
matters and trifles, or it may choose the most important evils
and concentrate its attention on the cases that will do most to
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tell the business man what is and what is not allowed.
Between June 19, 1936, and December 2, 1940, the Commission
issued 156 complaints on alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman
Act, Hundreds of other cases were investigated, and probably
thousands of letters v/ere received vrhich did not warrant inves-
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t igation.
The activities of the Federal Trade Commission have not
been free from criticism by conservatives and liberals alike,
and the courts had unduly hampered its activities. Recently,
however, we have been getting some very encouraging reports of
the Federal Trade Commission's activities. Pendleton Herring,
after having made a study of the personnel from 1914 to 1940,
"See Administrative Procedure in G-overnment Agencies . Federal
Trade Commission . Part 6, 76 Congress, Senate Document 136,
Government Printing Office, 1940.
The Annual Reports of the Federal Trade Commission give a
summary of the facts each year. For instance, for the year
ending June 30, 1939, the Commission reported 173 investiga-
tions, v/ith 32 complaints filed, (page 5) Eight hundred fifty
three investigations had been started up to June 30, 1940.
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reported:
"Within the last few years the Commission has
entered upon its work with increased vitality. There
is evidence of collective thought and active leadership.
The Robinson-Patman Act and the V.Tieeler-Lea Act have given
the Commission new authority and nex^r responsibility...
The Federal Trade Commission, v;hen viewed in terms of its
personnel today seems to have reached a happier stage than
in any previous years of its activity . "^'^
A review of a few complaints and orders of the Commission,
selected for their interest rather than for any necessary import-
ance vrill give concreteness to a study of the Commission's
enforcement of the Act. (The docket number is given for con-
venience. )
Philip Morris was asked to explain v/hy certain dealers were
paid for v:indow and counter displays when the sa.me arrangement
was not available for other dealers. (3919)
The Corn Products Refining Co. was asked to explain its
practice of giving some customers advertising services not avail-
able to competitors; the Corn Products Refining Co. was also
accused of giving one customer a lower price on condition that
he did not buy from a competitor of Corn Products. (3653)
The cosmetic companies have received considerable attention
from the Commission. Elizabeth Arden was asked to explain the
54E. Pendleton Herring, "The Federal Trade Commissioners" 8
G-eorge V'ashington Law Review 338, at 363. Jan. -Feb., 1940.
See also "The Effect of the Robinson-Patman Act on the VJork
of the Federal Trade Commission," 54 Harvard Law Review
670, Feb. 1941.
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practice of supplying store demonstrators to some stores, and
not to others. (3133)
Complaint 3921 alleged that Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co.
gave "free goods" to some customers and not to others; that it
allowed the cash discount in 10 days for most customers but
extended the oeriod to 60 days for favored jobbers,
Luxor, a manufacturer of toilet articles was ordered to
make its ten-cent size available not only to chains but to
independent competitors. The company cannot discriminate by
making a popular size for one and not for another, if the dealers
compete. (3736)
Geographical price discrimination, vjhich was thought to be
a thing of the past, was the practice prohibited in 3740, Metz
Brothers Baking Company—ten cents for a 24-ounce loaf in Iowa
and eight cents for the same size in Minnesota. Union Starch
and Refining Co. Sold glucose and corn syrup at different prices
in different geographical regions. (3804)
The Hastings Manufacturing Co. (4437) paid some prospective
customers exhorbitant sums for the stock of competitors. One of
the least Justifiable pricing practices complained of is that of
giving a price based on the total amount of a certain product
used, whether or not the product is purchased in whole or in
part from the seller. The purchasers of $50,000 worth of salt
were given a special discount on the amount purchased, whether
the amount was $5,000 or $50,000. (Morton Salt, 4319; International
Salt, 4307)
These cases, selected at random, give an idea of the forms
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During the first five years of administering the Robinson-
Patman Act the Commission has passed on almost every phase of
the Act. Five cases have been carried to the courts, with uni-
form support of the Commission's interpretation. By studying
the five court cases and the dozens of orders of the Commission
(some orders and findings cover many, many pages; others only
one or tvjo) it is possible to give a general description of
the Act
.
The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to outlaw cer-
tain forms of price discrimination that were based not on
differences between the costs of serving different customers,
but on their relative bargaining power. Section 2 of the Clayton
Act had forbidden price discrimination where the result was a
tendency to limit competition or establish a monopoly, but the
section had been written to prevent the form of price discrimi-
nation used by the old "trusts" of the Sta.ndard Oil type—that
of cutting the price in one town, until a competitor was starved
out, while keeping up the price elsewhere. This type of geo-
graphical price discrimination had almost disappeared. Another
type of price discrimination had created a problem not subject
to the provisions of the Clayton Act which allowed differences
in price where the differences could be explained if there was a
difference in the quality or the quantity sold. In other words,
a small difference in quantity could account for a big difference
in price, regardless of the cost of serving the different cus-
tomers. A chain store, for instance, might buy a tremendous
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quantity of goods, for which It received a quantity price, and
at the same time demand frequent deliveries in small quantities
to its hundreds of stores, so that there xiras no saving on the
large order over the orders of smaller buyers who bought more at
one time than the chain, and paid a higher price.
The Rob in son-Pat man Act has given a stricter definition of
what constitutes price discrimination, A Quantity discount Is
not allowable unless there is some definite saving in the cost
in selling in quantity, and the discount may be no greater than
the saving affected thereby. The difference in price between
different customers must be justified by a difference in the
cost of serving them.
In one other respect, the Robinson-Patman Act has tightened
up the definition of price discrimination. If there is no injury
to competition, and no tendency to create a monopoly, neither the
older nor the newer Act prevents a difference in price. The
phrase in the Clayton Act "to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly" provided a most indefinite standard.
As interpreted by the Courts until the Van Camp decislon^^ this
clause was interpreted to mean that there must be an injury to
the competitors of the seller , not an injury to the competition
between those who bought from the seller. The decision of the
Van Camp v American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). To be
discussed in detail in another section.
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Van Camp Case, that unjustified discriminations in price are
forbidden where unfairness to the buyers results, is incorporated
in the Act.
Price discrimination may ta.ke many forms. Each type pre-
sents its special problems. The simplest, of course, is an out-
right reduction in price. Another is a discrimination according
to the tra.de status of the buyer, v^iich is not forbidden because
a lower price to a wholesaler than to a retp.iler does not injure
the retailer; he does not compete with the wholesaler. If, how-
ever, the manufacturer sells at a lov;er price to a retailer who
once sold a fev articles on a wholesale basis, and thereby
secured the designation of a wholesaler, there is a dlscrimihat ion
because the ">.Tiolesaler" v/ill sell at retail in competition with
the retailer who paid the price charged retailers. A discrimina-
tion can be given by an Improper classification of customers.
Various discounts present the most difficult cases. If one buyer
is given 2 per cent for cash in 10 days, and another is given
5 per cent for cash in 10 days, an obvious discrimination occurs.
Certain cumulative discounts, based on the total amount purchased
over a month or a year, may have no relation to the costs in-
volved. But discrimination need not be limited to the price
itself. One seller may be furnished sales helps, in the form
of advertising allowances, use of demonstrators or other services;
none of these practices is forbidden, but they must be open to all
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on a proportional basis.
It will probably be many years before all possible varieties
of price discrimination have been adjudicated, but the general
purpose of the Law is reasonably clea.r—no differences in price
to different customers, if competition is hurt thereby, unless
the difference can be Justified by the differences in the cost
of serving those customers. One important exception to the prin-
ciple that differences in cost can justify differences in price
is the provision that if the number of possible buyers in a very
low price range is small, the Federal Trade Commission may
arbitrarily fix the limits of quantity discount, on the ground
that there is a danger of monopoly arising from mere size it-
self. There is no indication that this provision will be used
unwisely, judging by past cases coming before the Federal Trade
Commission, but the provision is an interesting departure from
the philosophy of "size is no offence."
The only provision of the Act which has been tested in the
courts to date is the provision prohibiting brokerage allowances.
One method of securing a lower price in the past has been through
the use of a "brokerage allowance." In its Final Report on the
Chain Store Investigation,^*^ the Commission had much to say on
See Albert E. Sawyer, "The Commission's Administration of
Paragraph 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patraan Act: An Appraisal."
8 Q-eorge Washington Law Review 469, Jan. -Feb., 1940.
74 Congress, Senate Document 4, 1935, Chap. VII,
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the evils of brokerage allowances as a subterfuge for price
discrimination. The result was that in Section 2(c) not only
is brokerage paid to the buyer by the seller prohibited where
the effect is to limit or injure competition, but the provision
against payment of brokerage by the seller to the buyer is absol-
ute. This part of the Act has now been tested in all aspects by
five cases. ^®
The brokerage cases no doubt are important to the brokers,
but it is doubtful whether the brokerage section has any great
In the matter of Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Docket 3031,
January 25, 1938; 26 F.T.C.486.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v Federal Trade Commission
106 F (2d) 667 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939). Certiorari denied 308
U.S. 625 (1940).
Webb Crawford et al. Docket 3214, Webb-Craxirford v Federal
Trade Commission 109 F. (2d) 263 (1940).
In the matter of quality bakers of America, Docket 3218.
Quality Bakers v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F. (2d)
393, (C. C.A.I, 1940)
Biddle Purchasing Co., Docket 3032. Biddle Purchasing Co.
V Federal Trade Commission, 96 F (2d) 637,(1933) Cert, denied
305 U.S. 634.
Oliver Brothers, Inc. v Federal Trade Commission, 102 F- (2d)
763, (1939)
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economic significance. If the brokers were able to insert a
provision which requires the use of either an independent broker
or no broker, it remains to be seen v/hether the brokers as a class
will gain more from the transactions where brokerage might other-
wise have been paid to a "dummy" brokerage house associated with
the buyer, or whether he will lose as some of the large buyers
find it expedient to buy only from companies that use no brokers,
thereby eliminating any question of brokerage discrimination.^^
^^For a discussion of the legal aspects, see S. Chesterfield
Oppenheim "Administration of the Brokerage Provisions of the
Robinson-Patraan Act" 8 George Washington Law Review 511 Jan. 1940.
I
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CHAPTER IV
Effects on Channels of Distribution
Perhaps the most important question on the effects of the
Act is the question of its effect on mass distributors. There
can be no doubt that the original hopes of the little retailers
will not be fulfilled. That, hov/ever, does not mean that the
Act has no effect on the large scale buyers. As has been seen
in our previous discussion the Commission has by no means held
that a manufacturer must sell to the little buyer the proverbial
"one-twelfth dozen assorted" on the same basis as the buyer of a
carload lot. It can also be said that the Commission has not over
looked violations of the discriminations that favored the small
man, merely because he is small. The complaints and orders
issued by the Commission hit the big A&P and the small broker
who thought the laws would not apply to him. Some interesting
comments are given by Converse?^ which in the absence of any
statistically acceptable surveys, probably represents as real-
istic a picture as any:
"At this writing, it is said in business circles
that observance varies all the way from abandoning all
Quantity discounts to paying absolutely no attention to
the law. Soeaking generally, it is said that large
companies have tried to observe the law while small con-
cerns have paid little attention to it. Small concerns
seem to feel that government prosecutors will devote their
attention to the large companies and will not bother them,
at least not until the courts have fully interpreted the
law. Government prosecutors would rather shoot elephants
than sparrows .
"
Paul D. Converse and Barvey W. Huegy, Elements of Marketing
New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, p. 740.
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A year and a half later. Converse reported that "the general
opinion is that the large buyers are getting less price advantage
than formerly." The wholesale grocers. Converse found, felt that
the Act did not help them. The independents could see no great
61
difference in their position. Nevertheless, the point empha-
sized above by Converse, is repeated by Feldman—that a violation
by a large chain can be more easily detected than a violation by
a small independent
.
"A brief word about the economic effects of the RPA...
The RPA has unquest iona.bly eliminated some of the buying
advantages of the large buying organizations, but it has
by no means eliminated them all. As pointed out, the
Act permits price differentials reflecting sawVings in the
cost of manufacturing and in selling the goods to parti-
cular buyers, and there is considerable doubt in the writer's
mind whether the price differentials enjoyed by the chains
were ever in excess of these savings in the long run. In
the practical application of the Robinson-Patraan Act it is
frequently possible for small wholesalers to obtain larger
discounts than chain stores, chiefly because of the fact
that small companies are less likely to be attacked by the
FTC... The big chain, being in the limelight, cannot run the
risk of violation, while the little wholesaler can afford
to ta-ke a chance. "62
The financial agencies have consistently minimized the
63
effect of the Robinson-Patman Act on the chains.
Converse, "Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act on Quantity Selling."
34 Advertising and Selling . January, 1941, p. 31.
George J. Feldman, "Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and
its Minimization" 8 Law and Contemporary Problems 335, at 346
63poor's Industry and Investment Survey, Variety Chain Stores,
February 27, 1941, p. 25-23.
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Another section of the Act can be explained more satisfactorily
in a brief space. In addition to prohibiting outright price
discrimination between buyers who are in competition, as we have
seen, the Act also has one provision that forbids the payment of
brokerage—the fee usually paid to the special kind of middleman
v7ho acts for either the seller in finding buyers, or for the buyer
in finding sellers—the Act forbids the payment of "brokerage"
where the buyer is his own broker.
At 1iiis moment xve are interested in the brokerage clause only
in so far as its effect on the changing channels of distribution
can be seen. Converse^"^ reports that after the dummy brokerage
cases had been decided, there was an increase in the number of
"would be" brokers. Since companies like A&P c?.n save nothing by
not paying brokerage to an independent broker wherever the seller
uses brokers for any of his trade, the A&P has decided to buy
only from those companies viho use no brokers. The net effect
will probably offset any advantages the brokers may have secured
by passage of the Act.
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Feldraan, who acted as attorney for the A&P in some of
its brokerage cases, has little sympathy for the situation in
which the brokers now find themselves:
Converse, 34 Advertising? and Selling
. 31, op. cit
.
Feldraan, op. cit. 8 Law and Contemporary Problems 335, at 336.
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"The RPA has definitely eliminated the practice
of paying brokerage to buyers a.t least as far as the
corporate chains are concerned. Cases are still pend-
ing against some of the large voluntary chain organi-
zations to force them to discontinue the acceptance of
brokerage. The brokerage section, however, has proved
a boomerang against the very group that sponsored it.
As interpreted by the courts, this section prohibits
any buyer from accepting brokerage. It has been a
common practice of ordinary brokers to purchase an occa-
sional car of merchandise on their own accounts for resale
to their customers, but when they do this they cease to
be brokers on that transaction and become buyers, FTC
issued many cease and desist orders on this... A broker
must abandon this phase of his business,, , If this is a
bad bed, however, it is one of his own making."
A more important effect of the absolute prohibition of
brokerage allowances is the possible effect on the voluntary
and the cooperative chains, who often gain their chief buying
advantages from the brokerage fees received by them and passed
on to their customer-members. That such payments are clearly
without the law seems clear from a reading of the cases so far
decided, but some uncertainty exists beca,use the Federal Trade
Commission's order against Modern Marketing, °S Purchasing Agent
for the large Red and White Chain of groceries, has not yet been
handed down. It seems quite probably that the voluntaries will
find another way to return savings to their member-customers,
since the voluntaries, like the A&P, could buy entirely from
those companies who employ no brokers, and hence would not be
discriminating against other purchasers if lower prices were
Docket 3783. No action reported on this case up to June 15, 1941.
Complaint issued May 10, 1939.
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given to all in place of the brokerage allowance to those who
use brokers. The chief loss would then be on the brokers v;ho
v/ere displg,ced by the law they helped enact:
"Complaint against Modern Marketing, purchasing
agent for large voluntary chain for receiving brokers.ge.
If Commission's complaint is upheld, it vrill apparently
be a severe blov; to the voluntaries as they depend largely
on brokerage commissions for their income. The sponsor-
ing organization may, however, find a way of having the
manafacturer give the wholesalers lower prices and then
charge the wholesalers for their services. The RPA was
advocated as an anti-chain measure, ,, .So far it seems to
have hurt the independents as much if not more than the
chains. The Biddle and Oliver com^panies operated to help
the independent wholesalers who supply the independent
retailers. The limiting of advertising allowances hurt
many of the voluntaries, especially the smaller ones
which were not bip; enough to OT:)erate warehouses and
which were not tied up with wholesalers. There was a
decrease in the number of all types of groups and
ret'^ilers in all types of voluntaries and cooperatives
follov/ing the passage of. the RPA, If the compla.int
against brokera.ge fees should be upheld, another blow
would be struck at the independent s, "67
Converse believes that one effect of the Law may be to
greatly increase private brands. Since the only ruling made so
68
far, that of U.S. Rubber Co., did not allow a difference in
brand as a "difference in quality" under the Act, it is impossible
to say what the effect v/ill be on private brands.
The effect on manufacturers, on the whole, seems favorable.
There is no doubt that many a manufacturer gave greater volume
discounts than were economically Justified, and the Robinson-
Patman Act has given him a perfect answer to the pressure of
go
the large buyer.
^"^Converse, Elements of Marketing , op. cit., p,741.
^^Federal Trade Commission Docket 3685
^^G-rether. Prtnp Cnnt.rol . n.P.fi.'^.
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Q, Forest Walker, Economist for R.H. Macey & Co, Insists
that the manufacturer is getting too much protection:
"Practical experience with this statute Indicates
that it is freouently used, particularly in rising markets,
as an excuse to deny justifiable quantity discounts. It
may well be that these discounts do not lessen competition
substantially, but many manufacturers are either unwilling:
to assume responsibility for proving their validity or
simply desire to use the statute to secure higher prices.
It is doubtful that the law has conferred any real benefit
upon its trade sponsors; and it has undoubtedly raised
many prices. It should be promptly revised,""^
Some possible long-range effects on distributive channels
will be discussed in a later chapter. Unfortuna.tely, neither
Mr. Walker nor those who deny that the Act will raise prices to
the consumer are able to offer anything in the way of proof
that cannot be challenged. Perhaps we shall have to wait
longer before forming any final judgment.
Q. Forest Walker, Speech in Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 16,
1940, Reported in 150 Commercial and Financial Chronicle . 1698
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CHAPTER V
Price Discrimination in Business Practice: Some
Case Studies and Factual Investigations
It has been said that one of the most far reaching effects
of the Federal Income Tax Amendment was a forced development of
a system of financial accounting that would enable a business
man to know how much income he had; when it was necessa.ry to
know what charges to depreciation were deductible from the
earnings, a method of determining depreciation was a necessity.
To business men who are accustomed to thinking of depreciation
as Just as much a part of the cost of doing business as the cost
of hiring labor, it is almost inconceivable that for years the
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railroads operated without allowances for depreciation. A
future business man will probably be equally amazed at the lack
of present day information as to the cost of distributing goods
through different channels, and in differing quantities. In a
number of cases no one was quite so surprised as to the twists
and turns that a particular firm's pricing policies had taken
than the officials themselves. When one large company that Is
regarded as being more alert than most was asked to explain
Professor Clyde Ruggles of Harvard Business believes one of the
most serious present day problems of the railroa.ds is due to the
lack of provision for depreciation in the days before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission required that depreciation be figured
in as a cost of doing business; because of competition with
other means of transportation the railroads cannot now make up
for the depreciation which was not properly charged off a
generation ago.
c
certain price discrimination, they said that they could not
even begin to; the officials had never given any particular
thought to a planned price policy, but just met each situation
as it came up with the result that their pricing system was
something that like Topsy "Just growed."
Whatever the other effects of the Robinson-Patman Act may
be, there is no doubt that one of its greatest effects will be
the development of methods of analyzing distribution costs, A
brief review of some of the important investigations of price
discrimination, both before and after the Robinson-Patman Act
will help to keep down to earth a subject which is too often
discussed in the clouds,
A, The famous G-oodyear-Sears- Roebuck tire contract.
Sears Roebuck & Co, had not been satisfied with the opera-
tion of its tire department in 1926; Montgomery Ward, though a
smaller company, did far more tire business. Sears f§lt that
the manufacturers who supplied it with tires could be improved
on. An official accordingly sought out Goodyear, the largest
tire company in the country in March, 1926. A contract was
entered into which provided that G-oodyear was to manufacture
Sears' tire requirements on a cost plus basis—cost to include
manufacturing, shipping, handling, but no selling or advertis-
ing costs. To this figure Goodyear was to add 6 per cent profit
Tires were to be the same quality as Goodyear 's regular product,
but were to have a special tread and a special name—"All-State,
72
The testimony on the Federal Trade Commission's Investigation
on this case covers over 25,000 pages. A condensed summary of
100 pages is given in Docket 2116, In the Matter of Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co.
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The contract between Goodyear and Sears carefully specified
that Sears was to make no mention of Goodyear In any way. Good-
year's competitors, of course, did their best to Inform both
their own dealers and Goodyear dealers that Goodyear provided
the tires sold by a new and powerful competitor of the old
Independent dealers, and It has frequently been rumored that
the whole crusade leading up to the Federal Trade Company's
extensive Investigation was prompted by a tire manufacturer who
would like to have had the Sears contract himself. Be that as
it may, the Federal Trade's Investigation v/as a new method of
settling a trade controversy. Prices were checked, dealers
Int ervlevred, cost records studied, analyzed. Interpreted, recon-
structed and reanalyzed. Out of the "trial by cost accounting"
came some slgnlflca.nt figures: from 1926 to January, 1954,
Sears paid a net price of $116,359,367.85 for tires purchased
from Goodyear. For the same number of tires sold during the
same period Independent dealers paid 141,216,788.48 more, or
$182,598,399.59. The records show the net realized prices, after
making allowances for all differences In costs, by size of tire
and dates of sale from 1927 through 1933. That these figures
would be challenged by Goodyear Is natural, but even If Goodyear
Is given the benefit of the doubt. Its own figures show a
discrimination of 112,701,012.65 In the profit made on the
sales to Independent dealers after allowing for differences In
selling cost, (that is, of course, on the same number of tires)
and the profit on tires sold to Sears.
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Margin Sheet Comparison of Net Billing Prices, Factory Costs,
and Distribution Expenses,
G-oodyear All V/eather Brand versus
Sears, Roebuck and Co. All State Brand '^'^
ALL WEATHER
A
^» OU X c,± 4t . r D X ±y D.<cD X cl O.UU X cl
iMeu Dining jrrice D • DO •7 "71r , ( ± ±U • Oo
racuory oost QQo . oy . f f . DO
Di R'tT'lbnt; 1 nn Exr»ensp 2.29 2 53 3 38 4 91
Total Cost 5!68 6.42 8.95 12.46
Net Operating Profit .98 1.29 1.73 2.29
ALL, STATE
4. 50 X 21 4.75 X 19 5.25 X 21 6.00 X 21
Net Billing Price 4.04 4.60 6.54 9.11
Factory Cost 3.51 4.01 5.76 8.06
Distribution Expense .28 .30 .37 .48
Total Cost 3.79 4.31 6.13 3.54
Net Operating Profit .25 .29 .41 .57
The chart is interesting in that it shows a very great
saving in distribution costs of selling direct to Sears; the
objection was not that Sears got the benefit of the full saving,
but that it received much more than this saving. It is also
interesting to note that the manufacturing cost was higher on
tires made for Sears. This higher cost of manufacturing was
largely due to Sear^' habit of doing heavy buying during the
74
months when production was heaviest. Deliveries were often
for five or six tires going to one store of Sears and did not
differ from run-of-the-mill deliveries to smaller customers.
73s ource: G-oodyear' s own figures. Docket 2116, p. 52
74Ibid., p. 59. Evidence not too clear on this point.
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Sears paid on an average of 29 per cent to 41 per cent less
for the same tire, after allowing for differences in all costs
except selling costs. If full difference in selling cost is
allowed, the net discrimination is 11 to 22 per cent. Sears,
in turn, sold at 25 per cent to as much as 35 per cent under the
prices of independents. The complaint was not that Sears under-
sold the independents, but that Sears could undersell because of
its buying advantages not Justified by differences in cost. A
tire dealer operating on a 22^ per cent margin was not in a very
good condition to meet a cut of 25 per cent. The commission
found that the net effect was to reduce competition by eliminat-
ing the independent competitors. Competitors of G-oodyear took
over the business of one independent after another, and operated
these outlets as company stores in order to save their business.
These manufacturer's stores were operated at a loss.
Of the many interesting phases of this case, none Is more
remarkable than the total neglect of the immediate interests
of the consumer. There can be no doubt that competitors were
injured, nor can there be the slightest doubt that the consumer
got far more for his tire dollar. The case illustrates perfectly
the prevailing philosophy that competition by itself is able to
serve the consumer's interest; that the public must be served
by keeping many competitors in business so that the rivalry
between competitors will save the consumer from the necessity
of buying from a monopolist. At the same time, it is worth
noting that the competitor who does drive dovjn prices to the
consumer can be open to severe public censure. Further analysis
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on the conflicting duties of competition is interesting, but
beyond the limits of this discussion.
G-oodyear was protected by contract from having to increase
its plant to take care of temporary demands of Sears by the
proviso that while Goodyear would furnish Sears requirements,
those requirements would not exceed 25 per cent of its total
business. G-oodyear did not expect to do all its business with
Sears; it depended on its independent outlets for 75 per cent
or more of its sales; but to get the 25 per cent or less it made
competition very difficult for the dealers who sold the 75 per
cent. The provision that G-oodyear should not be compelled to
provide more than 25 per cent is probably explained by a practice
of large buyers of increasing the per cent of total output of a
given manufacturer until that concern, by neglecting its other
markets has put itself in a position where it finds it difficult
to turn down any kind of an offer from the large buyer. When
the arrangement had been in existence for several years, G-eneral
Wood, President of Sears, announced that he thought he could do
better with some unnamed company, and was therefore about to
give notice that the G-oodyear contract would be cancelled when
the due date for cancelling arrived. Then, in order to induce
Sears not to cancel, in a separate agreement that was not reported
to its stockholders, G-oodyear gave Sears 18,000 shares of no-par
stock (for which it had previously paid over ^51, 000, 000) plus
$800,000 in cash which Sears was to use in buying more G-oodyear
stock.
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That the low prices being given to Sears were not prices
G-oodyear would care to defend openly is proved, first, by Good-
year's vigorous denial that it sold any tires to Sears; second,
by the contract provisions for secrecy as to the source of the
tires; and, third, by the granting of the highly unusual bonus
of cash and securities equal to over ^1,200,000.
The Commission ordered G-oodyear to discontinue its discrimi-
nation in prices between Sears and other customers, to the extent
that the differences were not a reflection of Goodyear' s saving
in cost on the Sears' business. Goodyear could remove this discrimi-
nation either by lov^ering its price to others or by raising its
price to Sears.
Goodyear carried the case to the courts. After some delay,
the Court of Appeals held that there was nothing in the Clayton
Act to prevent a discrimination in price between two buyers, as
long as there was a difference in quantity purchased. The court
held with Goodyear that under the Law as it was before 1936 there
need be no relation between the reduction in price and the reduc-
tion in cost to the seller made possible by the increased quantity.
In the meantime, however, the Robinson-Patraan Act had been passed,
and both the Commission and Goodyear agreed that the contract
wa.s a violation of the price discrimination provision of the
Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
The court seems to have been correct in its contention that
Congress did not have this type of price discrimination in mind
when the Clayton Act was passed; the only type of price discrimina-
tion which had come to the attention of the legislators was the
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old trusts' practice of cutting prices in one locality to drive
out a competitor, while holding up prices in the areas where
75
competitors were less bothersome. The Commission has recently
brought to light a number of instances where this type of geo-
graphical price discrimination is still prevalent, but geographi-
cal price discrimination is no longer an acute problem for public
policy. While G-oodyear was held not to have violated the law,
the publicity of this type of a price structure, favoring the
outlets that could exert the greatest bargaining power, was one
of the big reasons for changing the law.
The attitude of the Commission towards large buyers is veil
expressed in a few paragraphs taken from the one hundred page
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summary in the G-oodyear case,
"The practice of giving large and powerful
purchasers a disproportionately large discount is
not justified. Such a discrimination, v^hen made merely
on account of size, tends toward monopoly and the sup-
pression of competition. If the oua.ntity proviso be in-
terpreted to mean that a manufacturer can discriminate
with respect to quantity sales to any extent he desires,
the section would be rendered meaningless and ineffective.
It is clear that the quantity proviso can only have been
intended to preserve to the large buyer the inherent econo-
mies of large purchases and does not give a manufacturer a
license to grant him a favored or ice without restraint.
Quantity discounts are exempt because such a discount
involves some economic utility that should be preserved."''"^
^^Studies of legislative history of Clayton Act by John Perry
Miller, in his Unfair Competition . Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1941, p. 130. This book. Just published, is one of a
series of three on Harvard Studies in Monopoly and Comget ition ,
'^^Docket 2116, pp. 93, 94, 95.
'^'^Docket 2116, p. 93.
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This following statement is noteworthy:
"...A manufacturer, under the Clapton Act, is
under a duty to comply with the law, /and he may not make
his bargains according to his own interests by discrimi-
nating as he pleases, however honest a.nd however justi-
fiable such course might be from the standpoint of
commercial Drinciple sJ7 Large industrial companies,
through price discrimination, can control competitive
business conditions among their customers to the extent
of enriching some and iniining others. Under the Clayton
Act, a manufacturer has no right to put dealers to any
such destructive disadvantage by any unjustified dis-
crimination. While a manufacturer has an interest in
making attractive offers, in order to secure as much
business as possible, it is, however, an interest which
can only be consulted and acted upon in subordination
to law. When one discriminates in price between competi-
tors he reduces the price to one or several of them.
Competition limits the selling price. When a competitor
is given a lower price it follows that his profit has
been increa.sed by just the amount of that reduction.
It equally follows that every competitor has been put
to a disadvantage in just that sum...
"In this case there is a price discrimination in
favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. which gives it an unfair
competitive adva,ntage, thereby producing an unjust com-
petitive situation between it and the independent tire
dealers. The discrimination is not grounded on efficiency
and cost. It is the opinion of the Commission that no
justification exists for this discrimination or method
of competition. "'^9
The G-oodyear case, coming as it did when the subject of price
discrimination was receiving the attention of Congress in the
hearings leading up to the Robinson-Patman Act, was taken as an
authoritative statement of the position of the Federal Trade
Commission. The Commission's contention as to what it would like
to have the Clayton Act mean was effectively given the effect of
law in the new amendment.
78
Ibid, p. 94.
'^^Ibid, p. 95.
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B, The Federal Trade Commission's Chain Store Investigation.
In December, 1934, the Federal Trade Commission filed with
the Secretary of the Senate its Final ReDort of the Chain Store
Investigation . ^'^ This was the summary of 33 different reports
on various phases of the Chaih Store investigation conducted at
81
the request of Congress. This investigation produced the most
complete report on the chain store development in general, and
of price discrimination in particular, that has ever been made.
Congress had asked the Federal Trade Commission for a report on
the dangers of monopoly inherent in the tremendous growth of the
chain organiz^.tions and had asked for answers to specific ques-
tions. On most question, such as the question of whether the
chains v/ere guilty of cheating on weights and measures, or under
paid their help in comparison with the wage scales in the inde-
pendent stores, the Federal Trade Commission gave the chains a
clean bill of health. The Commission believed that it would be
unwise to strangle the development of chains by chain-store taxes,
because they found that the chains did bring about a reduction
in retail prices. The report found that chains competed vigor-
ously with each other as well as with the independents. While
74th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 4. Superintendent
of Public Documents. Published 1935. Serian number 9896.
70th Congress, Senate Resolution 224, 1928. Reproduced in full
in Final Report . 2.
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there was as yet no real monopoly, the Commission believed that
if the present trend toward chains continued, there was a real
danger of monopoly, at least in some geographical areas, in the
future. How to check this possiblility without sacrificing the
savings to the consumer was the problem.
The one aspect of the chain store question which seemed most
dangerous to the Commission was the ability of the chains to buy
from manufacturers at discounts that were based not only on the
admitted savings to the seller of doing business the way the
chains operated, but discounts that could be accounted for only
by the superior bargaining power of these large buyers. Large
chains bought more cheaply than small chains, and small chains
bought more cheaply than independents. The Federal Trade Cora-
mission believed that the greatest single advantage of the chains
was due to its buying advantages, not its operating efficiency,
82This finding is disputed by such authorities as McNair who
places much moit emphasis on the economies produced by such
factors as better management, integration of wholesale and.
retail functions, etc., and Phillips.^
82McNair, op, cit., 4 Law and Contemporary Problems 334, at 343.
^'^Charles F. Phillips "An Evaluation of Large Scale Retailing
With Emphasis on the Chain Store" in CTOvernmental Market
Barriers 8 Law and Contemporary Problems 348. at 349. Ts'pring 1941)
"McNair is perfectly correct in stating that 'integration of
functions rather than large buying poxi/er is the principal source
of chain store economies'".
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The report disposes of the idea that the large buyers used
"threats and coercion" to get loxA/er prices. These threats were
reduced to statements tha.t if the chains did not get the merchandise
at their own price, they would not buy from that seller. While
the Commission found that "in seeking to buy at the lowest possible
cost the chain does only what the independent does but its size
and bargaining povrer are such as to make its efforts yield far
85
better results than those of the independent."
The Commission felt that there was nothing either unfair or
illegal in the buying practices of the large companies, but that
if potential monopoly power of the large chains was not now sub-
jected to some check, there would come a day when competitors
would be eliminated. If one follows the reasoning that the chains
would eliminate all or most of their competitors, there is no
doubt that some action was called for. It might well be argued
that chains seem tota,lly unadapted to certain types of trade,
86
so that the independent would never be replaced completely.
Vifhether or not the conclusions of the Federal Tra.de Commission are
right, in its report it did bring to light market practices,
particularly price discrimination practices, that could not
87
exist except in the dark. Secrecy seems to be one of the first
Q^Chain Store Report, op. cit,, p. 24.
"-^Idera.
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See, for instance, discussion in Alexander, Marketing , op. cit.
p. 247, on this subject. Many authorities believe the chains had
reached the greater part of their growth before legislative
restrictions appeared,
^'^In addition to the material in the Final Report
. see Special
I
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requisites for the existence of the grosser forms of price
di scriminat ion . ®^
The two investigations briefly reviewed above dealt with
price discrimination before the passage of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The next tv:o cases arose since the Act v/as passed.
C. Bird and Son, Inc., Montgomery V/ard & Co., Inc.
Shortly after the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act a
complaint was issued against both Bird and Son for giving, and
against Montgomery Ward for receiving a discount of 14 to 18 per
cent more than the discounts given to retailers. The case came
up for trial before an examiner; as the evidence clearly showed
that there wa.s a difference of more than 14 to 18 per cent in the
respective costs of selling to retailers and to Montgomery Ward,
the complaint v/as dismissed. Because of the extreme simplicity
of this case, it is important only in showing that discriminations
as such are not forbidden when there is a Justification in the
89
cost of doing business with different outlets.
^"^Dlscounts and Allowances to Chain and Independent Distributors -
Q-rocerv Trade—one of the special volumes dealing: with one
particular part of the Federal Trade Commission's Cha-in Store
Inquiry. 73 Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document 89.
Washington 1934.
^SSee Reinhold P. Wolff's "Monopolistic Competition in Distribution"
op. cit., at 313. He treats the subject of buying advantages
of large distributors in a different light.
"The Law enforcing agencies were committed to a theory of
price equilibrium which did not take cognizance of the phenomenon
of "monopsony' on the buying side of the market. But the people
in Main Street frequently had a more realistic conception of
the threat of large scale enterprise, and made energetic efforts
to reverse public attitude."
89„
Docket 2937.
! I
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D. Standard Brands Case.
By far the most Important case that has arisen under the
Robinson-Patman Act up to the present time is the Standard
Brands Case. The report on this case covers fifty pages, and has
been referred to by members of the Commission as the best state-
ment on the part of the Commission as to the method of cost
analysis the Commission will use in the future. The investiga-
tions involved required three years time; the original complaint
was issued November 21, 1936, and the final order to cea.se and
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desist was not issued until June 15, 1939.
Standard Brands sells about 120,000,000 pounds of yeast
annually. This is from 55 per cent to 65 per cent of the yeast
manufactured and sold in the country. Through its 16 sales
divisions and 444 selling agents, it does business with customers
in almost every town in the United States having a bakery.
Yeast is necessary to make bread. One pound of yeast is used
for each 75 to 125 pounds of bread. Some bakeries are very large.
The A&P has 38 bakeries, and uses 5,000,000 pounds of yeast a year
to make bread for its thousands of stores. Continental Baking Co.
uses another 5,000,000 pounds of yeast, while General Baking Co.
Docket 2986, 29 Federal Trade Commission Decisions 121. This
case has been referred to by the members of the commission and its
staff. See remarks of E.L. Davis, Chairman of FTC, address before
American Institute of Accountants, Memphis, Tennessee, Oct. 18, 1940.
"Federal Trade Commission Procedure with Pp.rticular Reference to
Accounting," p. 7. The case is discussed by Professor F. Taggart
at great length in 21 Bulletin National Association of Cost Account -
ants 195-262, A shorter discussion is that of J. Brooks Heckert,
Analysis and Control of Distribution Costs . New York: Ronald
Press, 1940, p. 405-416, For an excellent statement of the Com-
mission's views and methods on Cost Accounting, see "Address of
Hon. Robert E. Freer, Commissioner, "Accounting Problems Under the
Robinson-Patman Act". Before Phil. Chap. Penn. Instit. of Public
Accountants, March 24, 1938, mimeographed.
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uses about 4,000,000 pounds. But there are 28,000 bakeries in the
United States,
The price schedule of Standard Brands was found discrimina-
tory in several ways. It is not surprising that the large chain
bakeries were able to get a quantity price for all members of
the cha.in. Suppose there were two bSvkeries, side by side, one
a chain, the other independent; each uses exactly the same amount
of yeast. The independent pays 25 cents a pound; the chain, taking
deliveries in exactly the same amount, pays 14 cents a pound
because the total requirements of all the outlets of this organi-
zation reach !|50,000 a month. V/here deliveries are important,
because of the highly perishable nature of yeast, it is impossible
to prove thrt there is any such difference as 9 cents a pound in
the cost of serving these two dealers.
The initial discrimination in favor of the chain is only
the beginning. VJe assumed in the illustration above that the
chain bakery actually did use the same amount of yeast as its
neighbor; actually, it was possible for the chain to buy ohly a
small part of its requirements from this one seller, and to still
get a lov/er price by far than the neighbor v/ho bou^t all his
supplies from tht seller; this strange result was made possible
by a system of quoting prices not according to the amount the
chain purchased from Standard Brands, but the amount of yeast
purchased from all sources . The explanation is probably something
like this: one yeast company was selling most of the require-
ments of a given chain organization; another yeast manufacturer
wished to get some business from the chain, and in order to get
(
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it, had to meet the lowest price the chain could get if it kept
all of its purchases with one supplier.
In this way it was possible for one chain to pay many thous-
ands of dollars per year less than its independent neighbor paid
for exactly the same quantity. If was, of course, impossible for
Standard Brands to prove a saving in the cost of delivering three
hundred pounds to Chain A, at 14 cents per pound, while selling
to the neighboring independent twice that quantity at 21 cents
per pound. There was only one reason for the difference, and
that reason was the superior bargaining power of the chain. This
discrimination in the cost of yeast was found to have an unfair
effect on the ability of the independent and the chain bakery to
compete in the sale of bread. The food industries operate on
an extremely small margin of profit, so that very slight differ-
ences in buying cost can make a big difference in ability to
compete in the market for the final product.
As an example of the narrow margins on v/hich the food dis-
tributors operate, the recent order against Stsjids.rd Brands, on
its other yeast product, the foil yeast sold to individuals, the
company vjas unable to show a Jus.tification in cost savings of
selling at 27 cents per dozen to retailers who took 300 units
per week or over, and 30 cents per dozen for retailers who took
less than 300. The company could justify prices of 23^ cents and
9130 cents for those same classifications. (Delivery must be made
to one store.)
Docket 2986, Release of May 8, 1940
i-
f-
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E. The Simmons Co.
Some methods of granting price discriminations are found in
the Simmons Case, Discounts based on the total amount of
goods purchased, not at one time, but during a month or a year
are called cumulative discounts. The Commission has found that
generally there is no saving connected with the amount purchased
over a period of time, as contrasted with the quantity purchased
at one time. Simmons granted a cumulative discount to individuals
and to members of buying groups. The Commission gives as examples
"An individual customer buying |10,000 worth of Simmons
goods in a year may receive no discount while a local com-
petitor purchasing only i?l,000 worth gets a discount of from
three to five per cent because it is a.llied with a syndi-
cate head (a group of individuals, corporations, cooperative
corporations or associations treated as a single customer.)
Yet, the Simmons salesmen may call upon the affiliated
Individual customer as often as upon the unaffiliated
individual customer, soliciting orders from and making
deliveries and extending other facilities to both in the
same manner.
"An individual customer purchasing olO,000 worth of
merchandise in a year and receiving a three per cent discount
because of being a member of or allied with a syndicate head,
the purchases of all of the members of which aggregate more
than $50,000 but less than ;$75,000, may compete with a local
dealer purchasing but ^1,000 xrorth of Simmons merchandise in
a year but receiving a five per cent discount because of bein
affiliated with a syndicate head, the purchases of all the
members of which aggregate more than $200,000. Yet orders,
deliveries and other facilities are extended to both in the
same manner while the average size of the deliveries to the
$10,000 individual customer getting the smaller discount is
apt to be larger than that of the ^1,000 customer receiving
the larger discount.
"Rebates or discounts from published prices for stand-
ardized products paid by Simmons v/ere found to aggregate more
than $500,000 in 1936; aporoximately S750,000 in 1937 and
more than $485,000 in 1938.
^^Docket 3840, May 39, 1939.
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CHAPTER VI
Towards a One-price Policy in Non-retail Sales?
Lest it be inferred that the examples of price discrimination
discussed above represent an examole of business conduct below
the standard required by the mores of the time, it should be
clearly understood that the words price discrimination are there
used to explain economic facts, not to express moral judgments.
There is nothing either good or bad about price discriminations
as such. The surgeon who charges a rich patient a thousand
dollars for a simple operation, and does not get back the cost
of his telephone calls from a poor patient who reauired the
highest degree of surgical skill is discriminating in his prices.
As Joan Robinson^*^ has said: "From the standpoint of society
as a whole it is impossible to say v/hether price discrimination
is desirable or not." John Maurice Clark, in his famous Studies
in the Economics of Overhead Costs . has an excellent chapter
on "Discrimination in the Modern Market," Clark says:
"Discrimination is not solely an economic fact. It
raises moral and social issues; it is the tool of favoritism
and greed and the vehicle of the highest social justice.
It may rouse our righteous resentment or our admiring com-
mendation. So far as overhead costs are concerned, the
role they play is passive; they oerrait discrimination;
the pursuit of maximum profit impels men to discriminate,
and most of the other motives known to man join in at one
time or another, playing a part and modifying the character
of the result."
Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition . London:
Macmillan, 1938. See Chap. 15, "Price Discrimination."
'University of Chicago Press, 1923. See Chap. XX, 416-34.
t.
73
For a definition, we may as well accept that of Joan Robinson,
whose chapter on "Price Discrimination" is much quoted:
"The act of selling the same article, produced
under a single control, at different or ices to different
buyers is known as price discrimination."
Public policy need not, and probably cannot, prohibit price
discrimination. Price discrimination can produce desirable or
undesirable social effects, vrith or without an evil motive on
the part of the discriminator. Public policy is interested in
the control of price discrimination when its results become unde-
sirable. In the past, price discrimination has been looked upon
as a tool used to achieve a monopoly position. It is now quite
generally recognized that price discrimination is first of all,
an evidence of the possession of some degree of monopoly power,
96
To quote Joan Robinson again:
"Under conditions of perfect competition price dis-
crimination could not ^xist even if the market could be
easily divided into separate parts. In each section of
the market the demand v;ould be perfectly elastic, and every
seller v:ould prefer to sell his x\fhole output in that sec-
tion of the market in which he could obtain the highest
price. The attempt to do so, vjould, of course, drive the
price down to the competitive level, and there would be
only one price throughtou the whole market."
Economics of Imperfect Competition f p. 179.
6Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. 179.
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Clark, who wrote his Economics of Overhea.d Costs in 1923,
before the newer definitions of monopoly were given by Chamber-
lain^^ and Joan Robinson, says that discrimination need not be
connected monopoly. The difference, no doubt, is mainly
in the definition given the word "monopoly" in 1923 and 1938.
Clark goes on to say that price discrimination is
"a natural result of overhead costs, and is found in
practically every phase of business. Sometimes it is
due to close figuring of costs and keen pursuit of prof-
its; sometimes to ignorance of costs or failure to allo-
cate them. It needs no elaborate explanation; rather,,
vjhen it is absent, its absence needs ex^la.ining. "99
The Oriental trader who expects to get the equivalent of
ten dollars from the poor bargainer, but only five from the man
who can match him in ability to "higgle," clearly has a discrimi-
natory price policy. We often spea.k as though vie had a completely
non-discrimanatory price policy in our retail stores, because,
unlike our grandfathers, we do not "higgle " over the price to be
paid for a suit of clothes—we pay the "one price" or refuse to
pay it. There can be, and is, much discrimination in retail
pricing. A department store that prides itself on its "one-price
policy" buys Bayer's Aspirin, and the identical product which it
p. 433.
'Edwin Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition
.
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1938 Edition, see his comments on
this chapter of Clark in his introduction, p. 4
Clark, op. cit., p. 433.
I
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sells under its own name. One customer pays 49 cents, the
other 39 cents. Whether or not price discrimination should
include the practice of a retail store in charging what Watkins"^*^'
calls "market-minus" prices for goods on which the customer is
inclined to compare prices and "market-plus" prices on the arti-
cles on which comparisons are more difficult depends on one's
use of the word.
"Higgling" has disappeared from some sectors of the retail
market, but not from all. Few men pay the asking price for a.
Chevrolet or a Cadilla.c. Real estate men have an "asking" and
a" will take" price on a house. The Chevrolet may not vary its
printed price-, but the trade4n allowance makes an outright price
variation unnecessary.
It is not possible to say that retail dealers exercise no
discriminatory prices; it is possible to say that every one
knovrs vrhat price he must pay, and can put himself in a class to
take advanta-ge of any class price. Let us say that Bayer's
Aspirin is available in a full service old line drug store at
the corner for 50 cents. The druggist will deliver, and will
extend credit. The "regular" chain druggist across the street
carries Bayer's Aspirin at 45 cents, and in addition also carries
aspirin manufactured by the same company, but put out under the
label of the chain druggist at 39 cents. The "cut rate" druggist
100j4ypQn V/. Watkins, "Price Discrimination" in 12 Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences. 350,352. Macmillan, 1934.
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down the street will, if you insist, sell Bayer's at 29 cents,
but will attempt to sell you a product exactly the same not made
by Bayer, under his ov/n label, at 19 cents. The individual cus-
tomer may elect to pay 50 cents if he wishes, or he may pay less.
To say that there is no discrimination here is to misuse v^ords,
but nowhere in this type of dealing is there the special con-
cession to one of a class of buyers, none of the secrecy that
was evident in the pricing at the wholesale level. Lack of "higgling,"
then, does not mean a fixed price, or rigid price throughout an
industry.
Is "Higgling" or Haggling Necessary?
One of America's best authorities on merchandising, Melvin
101
T. Copeland, Believes that we have passed the stage where
higgling is necessary in either the retail or the wholesale
102
market. Two of Professor Copeland' s colleagues, E.P. Learner
and Nathan Isaacs, believe that haggling is necessary, and that
the ultimate consumer need not "hag^^le" only because the "haggling"
is done for them by the retpiler when he buys from the producer.
(Learner and Isaacs use the word "haggling;" Copeland, in the
same issue of the Harvard Business Review , uses "higgling."
Copeland believes that higgling was all right in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century agricultural eras, but that the modern
-^^-'-The Problem of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act 15
Harvard Business Review 156, (Winter 1937)
102The Robinson-Patman Law, op. cit., same issue, p,137ff.

77
producer is interested in a smooth flow of goods. If the customer
must higgle over each transaction, he places his orders now and
then.
Copeland's colleagues asklO^
"But how can we check ha.ggling without checking com-
petition? Have we not thrown out the baby with the
bath water"?
To the last question, we may say that a one-price policy of
Druggist A is a long way from a one-price policy for all retail
druggists. If Druggist A's prices are so high that Customer A
refuses to pay them, Customer A may go to Druggist B, whose prices
are lov/er. Perhaps Druggist A must lov/er his price; if he does
so, not only Customer A, but B, C, and D will get the same lower
price.
The Robinson-Patman Act applies somewhat the same principle
to non-retail selling. If manufacturer X sells a given product
at a lovj price to Retailer X, he must allow Retailer Y to buy at
the same price if Y is ready to buy the same quality and quantity.
(Manufacturer X m8.y, of course, refuse to sell Retailer Y at any
price—each seller may choose his customers.) If Retailer Z
wishes to buy under different terms than X and Y, and Manufacturer
X will be able to show a real saving on Z's order, there is nothing
to prevent Z from getting any discount that Manufacturer X can
justify on a cost basis. To this broad outline, there are several
exceptions: if the number of possible buyers in certain top
Ibid. p. 139.
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categories is very small, the Federal Trade Commission has the
right to fix quantity limits beyond which further price reductions
may not be given, even if otherwise justified. The Act is not
applicable to intra-state business, and the Act is not applicable
unless there is an injury to competition. If a seller deals with
a wholesaler and a retailer, prices need not be the same even
if no justification in cost can be shown, because there is no
competition between different levels of trade.
It is generally conceded that the "one-price policy" in
retail trade has made possible a more efficient distribution
system; the time of both the buyer and the seller is conserved.
Is it necessary for manufacturers and wholesalers to do business
on another basis? Copeland has long been an advocate of a one-
price policy. In his Principles of Merchandisinp: .•^'^'^ published
seventeen years ago, Copeland objected to such devices as quoting
prices less 60-10-10-10-5 to one customer, and 60-10-10-10-5-5
to another. The author believed that the chief value of that
type of price quotation was the questionable advantage of making
the differences in the quoted prices less easily discovered. As
long ago as 1924, Copeland found little justification for an
extra 2 per cent given to a big retailer as a matter of good
will. Quantity discounts given on all purchases in a given
period of time, as distinguished from quantity delivered at one
^°%elvin T. Copeland, Principles of Merchandising
. Nev; York:
Shaw, 1924, Chap, XI, "Price Policies,"
r
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time was a matter of "csfrrying favor with large customers."
105Copeland tells of the experience of a paint manufacturer:
"Our price for tinted glass paint is $1.35 a
gallon, with some dealers, at the discretion of the
salesms.n, this price may be dropped to $1.30 a. gallon.
In exceptional cases a price of $1,25 may be quoted; but
should the case be very exceptional, the price may be
made $1.20; and if extremely exceptional, even as loxir
as Jipl.lS."
A two-price policy on the part of a retailer is now almost
unjustifiable, and a two-price policy on the •::art of a wholesaler
has little to be said in its favor. The problem of the manufac-
turer is not so simple. The retailer's customers are generally
in the same class—i.e., purchasers in small quantities for
ultimate consumption. The manufacturer may sell to ultimate
consumers, to retailers, to wholesalers, to other manufacturers.
No one is asking that he must give the same price to customers
who may demand a variety of services at a variety of costs; the
manufacturer is told that his prices must not discriminate against
one member of a given class. But in addition to this difference
in the classification of his customers, the manufacturer also has
the problem of overhead costs and the accounting problems that
go with overhead costs. It may happen that a manufacturer will
sell goods to a big buyer for less than their true cost because
this added volume of business will make it possible to make up
106
the difference on his regular orders. To use Alexander's
illustrat ion:
Ibid., p. 360
'Alexander et al, Marketing , op. cit., p. 387.
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"This seeming impossibility arises from the prevalence
of overhead costs. Consider this situation: a manufacturer
has overhead expenses amounting to $600,000 a year. His
annual capacity is a million units, though he is able to
sell only 600,000 to his regular customers, the wholesalers
and retailers. His direct costs are $1 per unit. He must
charge somewhat more than $2 per unit for all goods sold
to his regular customers. Suppose a chain offers to buy
from him 400,000 units a year. If he computes his overhead
upon the same basis as before, his costs are |l,60 a unit
(|l direct and 60 cents overhead.) He can afford to sell
the chain system for even less than the $1.60, provided he
can continue to dispose of 600,000 units to the vrholesalers
and independent retailers at $2 or thereabouts. As a
matter of fact, under such circumstances it will be prof-
itable for him to sell to the chain system for any price he
is able to get a.bove $1, his direct costs. All excess
above that figure can be applied to reduce the overhead
or can be considered as profits."
It is easy to see how a price of anything over a dollar to
the buyer vjho came after the regular customers had paid the year's
overhead can unjustly enrich the last buyer at the expense of
the others. This system of charging no overhea.d on a particular
order is definitely outlawed by the words of section 2(b) of
the Act. The seller may pass on only the saving due to the
particular order as part of the entire production of the plant.
If it had not been for the purchasers of the original 600,000
units, it would clearly be Impossible for the new buyer to be
offered any such price.
Perhaps the greatest single force tending towards a less
arbitrary price structure is the new possibility of requiring
publicity of price discounts. The Act does not require any
public announcement of prices, but since any one ca.n make a
complaint which may lea.d to an investigation by the Federal
Trade Commission, it behooves the manufacturer to be able to
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show a price system that will stand the light of day. If regular
customers of a given concern find that someone else is getting
the same product at much less money, there is a lot of explaining
to do. The competitors of the discriminating firm will not be
backward about spreading such news. This new requirement of
107publicity, indirect though it is, is in accord vjith business
tendencies in other phases of business life. The Securities
and Excha.nge Commission has on file more complete financial
reports than have ever before been given out on every company
that either has stocks or other securities listed on a stock
This tendency towards greater publicity of all types of factual
data seems too widespread to be a merely temporary matter.
Consider the interest in the consumer movement, as an indica-
tion of further need for information about quality and contents
of merchandise. The best treatment of this subject is that
of Kenneth Dameron "The Consumer Movement" 17 Harvard Business
Review
. 3271, (Spring, 1939) and his "Retailing and Consumer
Movements" 5 Journal of Marketing 385, April 1941. Alexander
has an excellent chapter (26) " Consumer Problems and the
Consumer Movement" in his Marketing 6 op. cit. 661-683.
For a wider requirement of publicity, including publicity
of prices, see H.S, Dennison, and J. K. G-albraith Modern
Competition and Business Policy . New York: Oxford University
Press, 1938, Chap. VIII, "Industrial Publicity," expecially 91.
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exchange, or has Issued any form of new securities since 1933.
Copeland ha.s contended that the secrecy behind the objectionable
price discriminations is the worst part of a bad system. It
leads to suspicion on the part of all buyers tha,t some one else
got a better buy. V7ith the tremendous growth in size of many
American corporations, with thousands of stockholders
,
"private
business" as it was knov/n in the days of petty capita.lism has
been for some years a thing of the past in ma.ny lines of commerce.
In its larger aspects, the restriction on the ability of the
individual firm to give whatever prices its own bargaining power
arid its own business Judgment dictate is in line with a strong
tendency towards limiting the freedom of the firm in its actions.
Regulation has increased in almost every aspect of business. As
to the wisdom or unwisdom of that policy this paper is not con-
cerned, except as it touches the special, limited subject of con-
trol of price discrimination. If the writer is allowed an opinion
on the wisdom of controlling the limits within which price
discrimination may be exercised, he would quote with aDDroval
108
the statement of John Perry Miller:
"Unsystematic price discrimination in industries
where buyers are of equal strength may be tolerated
as necessary to induce price flexibility, while between
unequal s it may be an undesirable practice."
Miller, Unfair Competition , op. cit., p. 408
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CHAPTER VII
Some Economic Implications of the Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Pat man Act is now the law of the land. For
better or worse, it apparently is here to stay. It seems worth
while to exa.mine some of the economic implications flowing from
the fact that an Act v/hich touches so much of our commercial
life at the vital spot of price should be so long in developing
a meaning. Some few points seem to stant out,
A, The Rob inson-Pat man Act has shown how little we know about
the complex forces affecting industrial markets.
It is natural that we should devote our attention to produc-
tion before vre devoted our time to distributing the products of
109
,that production. In an economy of scarcity, marketing and
selling problems are but secondary. For many years both the
practical business man and the economist neglected a study of
the selling process and selling costs. Under a theory of perfect
110
competition, selling cost does not enter into our calculations.
The newness of the study of distribution (used synonimously
with marketing—not the distribution of economic theory) is
well illustrated by the meeting of the American Marketing
Association in Chicago over the Christmas holidays. The
story of the first marketing classes held in an American
College was told by the men v/ho organized the classes.
Marketing a.s a subject goes back practically no farther than
1910. See V Journal of Marketing 4 issued In April 1941
for a collection of these papers.
-^-^
^Albert L. Meyers, Elements of Economics
. New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1937. p. 144-162.
See also Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition , op. cit.
Chap . 8
.
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When the Robinson-Patman Act demanded an ana,lysis of distribution
costs, business man, government employer, and accountant alike
had to admit a surprising lack of knowledge.
The lack of knowledge of costs of distribution is only
one evidence of our general lack of adequate knox^rledge of the
first book devoted exclusively to costs of distribution
seems to be Heckert's Analysis and Control of Distribution
Cost . cited supra. Chapter V, which a.ppeared in 1940, Since
1936 many excellent studies have been made on special aspects
of the cost problem. The studies of the Federal Trade
Commission, begun several years ago when the Commission was
convinced by its administration of the Robinson-Patman Act
that information on distribution cost was not available, has
not been released to date. For other studies, see, for
example, Robert Harbeson, "The Cost Conce-ot and Economic
Control" 17 Harvard Business Review 257, (Spring 1939)
Clarence B. Nickerson, "The Cost Element in Pricing" 18
Harvard Business Review 417, (Summer 1940). Walton H.
Hsjnilton, "Cost as a Standard For Price." 4 Law and Con-
temporary Problems , op, cit, 321. Ralph D. Cies,
"Costing Problems Posed by the Robinson-Patman Act"
17 Harvard Business Review 350, (Spring, 1939.) In the
texts on marketing, by far the best discussion is that of
Alexander, Marketing
.
op. cit., chap. 23.
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market. More important is a knox^^ledge of the type of market we
want. For fifty years we have had on the statute books as the
statement of our fundamental policy towards our markets, the
Sherman Act of 1890. The Temporary Na.tlonal Ecohomic Committee
was formed to study the effects of concentration of economic
power. To evaluate the Sherman Act and its working was one
major problem of the Committee's work. When two distinguished
scholars were called on to summarize the Sherman Act, about the
only point on which they fully agreed was that the Act had not
accomplished the purpose of preventing monopoly. The author of
112
Monograph 16, Walton H, Hamilton, of Yale believed the Act
had not succeeded because it had been designed for another age,
113
Another distinguished authority, Milton Handler of Columbia,
found that the Act had not succeeded because it had not been
enforced.
The same conflicts expressed in the opinions of Hamilton
and Handler are combined in no other person than that of the
present head of the Anti-trust Division of the Attorney-general's
office—Thurman Arnold. In 1957, when Mr. Arnold was a private
citizen teaching law at Yale, he could express himself freely.
He found the Sherman Anti-trust Act an interesting subject for
112
Walton H. Hamilton, Anti-trust in Action. Investigation on
Concentration of Economic Pover. Monogranh 16 . Washington, 1941.
113A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal
Anti-trust Laws. Monograph 38 . 1941.
See pp. 1, 100,
r
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1 14his facile pen. ' Arnold described the Sherman Act as a part
of the mythology by which we reconciled the economic needs for
big business with our political ideas that we could not have
big business, "In order to reconcile the ideal with the practical
necessity it became necessary to develop a procedure which con-
stantly attacked bigness on rational, lega-l, and economic grounds,
and at the same time never really interfered with combinations."
But shortly after Arnold wrote the Folklore of Capitg.lism—and
possibly because of the fame he achieved in having written it
he was appointed to direct a new attempt at enforcing the Sherman
Act. Then he wrote a different book in which he took quite a
different view of the anti-trust laws.-^-^^
Enforcement of the Sherman Act then became necessa.ry for the
economic sa.lvation of the country.
For several years Harvard Graduate School of Public Administra-
tion ha.s conducted a seminar on "price policy." One of the men
who helped to conduct the course summed up the present sta.te of
116
our knowledge of industrial markets, when he wrote:"^
114
Thurman Arnold, Folklore of Capitalism
. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1957, especially Chap. IX, "The Effect
of the Anti-trust Laws in Encouraging Large Enterprises."
Bottlenecks of Business . New York: Reynal and Hitchcock
1940.
116
Wallace, "Industrial Markets" op, cit. p. 99,
r
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"Acquaintance with the work done In this field by
economists, government officials, business men, and others
leads to the conclusion that there exists at present no
body of knowledge adequate to support a comprehensive
program of public policy of any sort tov/ard the industrial
markets. The best that vie can hope for in the immediate
future is that what knowledge we have will be used to
avoid mistakes in oolicy and to make a few constructive
changes
.
"It appears that there is no general agreement, even
among economists, on a centra,l set of issues in this field,
to say nothing of diagnosis and proposals for policy."
If we don't know what sort of a market we need, obviously,
we are in no position to be very dogmatic about what is good and
bad in policies that promote certain marketing policies. As to
the anti-trust laws in particular, Wallace"^"^'^ reported:
"It has been repeated with pardonable monotony
that we have never re?.lly tried to enforce the anti-trust
laws. A more pointed observation is that x-^e have never
really tried to find out what sort of lavjs should govern
industrial organization and business practices."
A hopeful sign is that there has been more attention given
to the study of the market in the last decade than at any previous
time. There is no one book which has won anything like universal
acceptance even in its diagnosis of the problem, much less its
prescription for a cure. Among the more important books, one
should probably begin with the exhaustive study of Arthur Robert
118
Burns in his Decline of Competition . The question might be
raised as to whether a better title would be The Decline of
117
Wallace, "Industrial Markets" oo. cit. o.59.
118
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.
I
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Competition as a Regulative Force , rather than The Decline of
Competition . Like the study directed by G-ardner Means In The
119
Structure of the American Economy . Burn's work goes farther
to prove that there has been a change In the direction In which
competition Is working than to prove that competition Itself
has declined. The excellent Monograph Number 1 of the TNEC,
120
Price Behavior and Business Policy emphasizes the need of
caution In forming conclusions about the Intensity of competi-
tion. It Is oulte possible for three big automobile companies
to compete more savagely than fifty small companies. One theme
does run through all three studies, and that Is that the market
does not work as automatically as we vrere likely to think It
did before case by case studies v;ere Inaugurated. Burn's thesis
Is that the number of firms In many industries has so greatly
decreased that it would be Illogical for any firm to form a price
policy without regard to the effect of that firm's price policy
119
Part 1. National Resources Committee, Washington, 1939.
12076 Congress, 3 Session, Investigation of Concentration of
Economy Power . V/ashlngton, 1940, written by Saul Nelson
and Walter Keim under direction of Edward S. Mason.
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on the market Since all theories of perfect competition are
Arthur Robert Burns, The Decline of Competition . New York:
McG-raw-Hill, 1936, For short summary of Burn's position,
see especially pp. 40, 41, 42,
"The characteristic of industrial orga.nization during
the present century is the growth of firms large enough in
relation to their industries as a whole for it to be irrational
for them to disregard the effect of changes in their output,
or their price policy, upon the market as a whole; they must
take account of the effect of a reduction in price not only
upon the volume of their sales but also upon the total revenue
from these sales. They find themselves in the position of
a monopolist in that, in pursuit of the maximum of income,
they must choose the best combination of price and sales,
having regard for the effect of changes in output upon costs.
The development of these large units is partly due to changes
in the technique of production and distribution. Social
policy, however, has contributed to this development in a
variety of ways. Corporation laws have facilitated the con-
centration of control of large quantities of the means of
production. The patent law, partly directly and partly indir-
ectly, has stimulated and protected concentrations in some
industries, although the courts have progressively restricted
the rights of patentees. The anti-trust laws have failed
to prevent, but have not directly caused increasing concen-
tration of control and the development of price and production
policies appropriate to new cond.it ions; they have diverted
the adaption into particular channels."
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based on the assumption that no one buyer and no one seller will
influence the action of the market by his own action alone, the
market does not act as it is supposed to act. Means' particular
attack is on the lack of price flexibility, and deals with the
reaction on the economy of tv/o systems of prices: one, a market
system, in which the prices of agricultural products in parti-
cular were set before they too became controlled prices, and
"administered" prices of the firm that exercises a considerable
influence over its price policy. A more complete study than any
of the others is that of Walton Hamilton and Associates, Price
122
and Price Policiest This book contains the industry-by-industry
study of prices originally made for the Cabinet Committee on Price
Policy. This fascinating compilation offers a wealth of detail
not elsewhere available on pricing policies on seven different
industries. As to conclusions, Hamilton says:
"The sovereignty of the market is past; political
controls are here and we must subdue them to the public
interest as best v/e can. "123
The important point is not the conclusions reached by any
of these studies (it is almost fair to say that each has gone
far towards disproving the thesis of its predecessor) but that
studies are being made
.
Perhaps some day we will have enough
information on which to decide what kind of a marketing policy
we need, and what kind of laws will bring about that policy.
^^%ew York: McGraw-Hill, 1938.
123
Ibid., 556.
(
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B, The Robinson-Patraan Act is evidence of a change from the
simple picture of monopoly versus competition.
124
The principle of the Sherm.a.n Act is that if a free market
is maintained, no other form of regulation is required—the economy-
will, by and large, regulate itself. To accoraDlish this purpose,
monopolies were prohibited, restraints of trade declared illegal.
The world was divided betvjeen the black of monopoly and the white
of competition. Monopoly was bad, competition v;as good. True,
some monopolies had already been found to be "natural monopolies"
that were to be controlled by public regulation rather than the
informal controls furnished by competition. The United States
Supreme Court was probably ahead of economic theory vjhen it
declared that not all restraints were illegal, but only "unreas-
125
enable" restraints. An examination of the records of Congress
at the time the Act was passed will show that those v/ho framed
the Act never did have the faith in the ability of a one-page
statute to prescribe an industrial pattern for an industry.
This important Act was discussed less than one day in the Senate
and not at all in the House. The discussions that have been
referred to in the futile attempt at securing a clear Congressional
intent were directed at the Sherman Act, which was never passed.
•^^^26 Stat. L. 209, U.S. Code, Title 15, C.I., Sects. 1-7.
l^^standard Oil Co. v U.S., 221 U.S. 1. (1911).
t
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Sherman's bill was replaced by one written Senator Hoar of
Massachusetts, xx^ho had little sympathy for any bill stronger
than was necessary to dispose of the issue so that the Congress
could get to the important vjork of passing a tariff bill. Senator
Hoar had no intention of outlawing monopolies in the economic
sense, but used the word in the sense that the law had always
12S
used it in the Statute of Monopolies.
The statement of A.C. Hoffman, Principal Agricultural Economist,
Department of Agriculture in Temporary National Economic
Commission's Monogra-oh 35, op. cit. p. 145.
Larpre Scale Organization in the Food Industries ;
"It is important to note at the outset that the Sherman
Act was passed primarily for the protection of the public
rather than for the special benefit of the small enterpriser.
\-ftille the com.plaints of the latter undoubtedly weighed heavily
with the legislators, their main concern was to protect users
and consumers of goods and services against exhorbitant prof-
its and undue price enhancement by the monopolist. Certainly
this was uppermost in the mind of Senator Sherman, whose
objective seems to have been much different from that of
some recent legislators whose purpose is only to aid small
firms in lines of industry which are admittedly competitive."
If the author of Monograph 35 had consulted Monograph 16
Walton H, Hamilton, Anti-trust in Action , he would have
discovered that the only reason the Sherman Act did not
embody the special desires of Senators fighting for their
respective classes v/as that each Senator had a special class
to argue for, so that the bill was sent to the Judiciary
Committee "to deliver the child for nurture to those who
had most interest in its death." The conservatives, led by
Senator Hoar of Massachusetts h8,d written a law that was
"...something at least, for the people back home. And
the Congressional campaign was warming up. Besides there were
^' matters of real consequence, such as the McKinley Tariff Act
which wanted legislative attention. So, with ohly a single
vote of dissent ,.. .on the second of July, 1890, the bill
became the law of the land. It is to this day strangely
enough called the Sherman Act—for no better reason, according
to its author, than that Senator Sherma.n had nothing whatever
to do with it." Idem. p. 10.
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At the time the Rohlns on-Patman Act vras passed there v/as
much dispute as to whether it was really a part of the anti-trust
legislation, and as such aimed at maintenance of competition, or
whether it vras like the N.R.A. basically an anti-competition
creature parading under the something it was not . Was it an
Act to maintain competition or to restrain competition? To
this question we can say to both sides, "You were right." We
can say that the purpose is to promote competition and to restrain
competition, for the Act is an expression of the idea that com-
petition itself often needs restraint, for competition, if too
intense, may often lead to monopoly. No doubt this statement
needs explanation.
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The purpose of the original anti-trust legislation was to
outlaw monopolies and to prevent competitors from getting together
to agree not to compete. The sissumption was that if competition
were allowed to operate, the rivalry of the competitors was the
only safeguard needed by the public. If the seller chose to be
unreasonable, the buyers would go to another. If all present
members of a trade should become unreasonable, new entrants
to the trade would bring the old members to time. As long as
competition was preserved, no other method of regulation was
•^^"^See Edward S. Mason, "Mono'ooly in Ls.w and Economics" 47
Yale Law Journal 34, Nov. 1937.
G-rether Price Control , op. cit., Chapt. XIV, "Law, Economics,
and Trade Regulation."
Miller, Unfair ComToetition
. op. cit., 393,402, and other
places
,
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needed. When competition failed to bring forth the right fruit,
it was because competition was being misused; it was unfair
i competition. The anti-trust legislation of the Wilson New Deal
attempted to say just what this unfair competition consisted of,
and to prohibit it through the Clayton and the Fair Trade Com-
mission Acts. The purpose was still to preserve rivals; if
there v/as rivalry between sellers, competition would still do
the trick. Therefore it was wrong to injure a rival by unfair
methods, because you interfered with his ability to continue as
a rival. The emphasis was on the methods used; if fair methods
were used, and the successful competitor eliminated competitors
without any unfair tactics, no amount of real monopoly power on
the part of the successful competitor was to be condemned.
Monopoly was in the eyes of the law a standard of evaluation
of the methods used to achieve m^onopoly power, and if no repre-
hensible methods were used to achieve that poxver, a combination
would not be dissolved Just because it v;as big. Monopoly was
a matter of intent, not results.
The Robinson-Patman Act represents a departure from this
simple Dicture. Where the earlier anti-trust laws looked at the
intent of the parties and condemned some acts that probably had
no harmful results . because there was an evil intent , the Robinson-
Patman Act condemns some act s that have never been considered
contrary to good business principles because those acts can lead
to bad results from a social view point . It can fairly be said
that the growth of the mass distributors has been almost entirely
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free of the Dractices indulged In by the early trusts. The
chains were not violating the business mores of their time when
} they pressed the manufacturer for a price that threw almost all
of the plant's overhead onto the regular independent customers,
but the effect of this buying advantage given to the chains was,
in the eyes of the Federal Trade Commission, none the less
responsible for the growth of the chains and the decline of the
chains' competitors. While the methods used by the chains did
not fall under the list of prohibited practices, the effect of
the chains' practices, according to the Federal Trade Commission,
would eventually lead to a monopoly, at least in certain locali-
ties and in certain lines. If the A&P could develop from next to
nothing to a position where it controlled 10 per cent of the
vital food supply of the nation in a short period of yea.rs, was
it impossible that the A&P could not handle a far greater share
in a few years more? The first step, then, was to say that the
buying advantages of the chains must be cut to the point xvhere
the difference in cost of goods to the big buyer and the little
buyer was limited to the differences in the cost of serving the
two buyers and not by their differences in bargaining DOwer.
The second step, probably not yet used, was to say that if there
were too few buyers who could qualify for a quantity discount,
the Federal Trade Commission had the right to limit arbitrarily
the amount of that quantity discount if a danger of monopoly
threatened. This second point is probably more important in its
theoretical lipplications than it is in practice, at least for the
moment. There can be no question that it goes far beyond previous
ideas of preventing monopoly.
(
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The Roblnson-Patman Act is a somewhat less than frank admis-
sion that competition is not always good, and that competition is
needful of restraints if monopoly is to be prevented. As in the
N,R,A,, which was based on the very antithesis of the doctrines
of competition, it was necessa.ry to frame the Act in terms of a
"good" word, competition. If the chains can compete so effect-
ively that their independent competitors are put out of business,
and the big chains can compete so effectively tha.t the smaller
chains are put out of business, it is quite . possible that the
very effectiveness of competition may be the eventual cause of
monopoly.
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When John Bates Clark • vrrote his Control of Trusts in 1912,
he probably expressed the general view of economists when he
said:
"The statute books of various states bristle
with laws...based on a true instinct-antipathy to the
monopolistic principle. The other way of attacking
the problem.
.
.rests on the belief, deep rooted in the
minds of the people, ths.t competition is not dead, that
the monopolistic powers of the trusts are accidental
and not inevitable, that they are built on privileges
that can be removed, powers that can be withdrawn and
predatory acts that can be forbidden."
The present day economists do not share J, B. Cla.rk's faith
in the power of competition to make things right. J.M. Clark,
son of J.B. Clark, comes close to a modern definition of
John Bates Clark and J.M. Clark, Control of Trusts
. 1912
quoted in Blaisdell, Federal Trade Commission
. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 3.
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competition in his new Social Control of Business :
"But what is competition? It may be defined in
general as rivalry for income by the method of giving
more than one's rivals give in proportion to what one
asks in return or by making the public think so, or by
making them at least act as if they thought so to the
extent of buying one^s goods in r^reference to those of
one's rival. Presumably the successful competitor is
giving people what they want, or at least making them
think he is giving them what he has made them think they
want. And this is a process to which Lincoln's saying
about fooling the people is peculiarly pertinent, includ-
ing the part about fooling some of the people all the time."
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J. M. Clark also says that competition is an exception
to the general rule that one must not use his property in a way
that will injure another. Perhaps we now are ready to limit
the ability of one man to injure another through competition,
because that is what all so-called "unfair competition" amounts
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to. As Miller has pointed out:
"The concepts of fair and unfair competition are not
economic, they are regulatory concepts indicating a dis-
tinction betv/een what is a.nd what is not countenanced by
public policy in the way of competitive practices. The
law of unfair competition and the law of fair competition
—
so far as any such have been developed, are essentially
lav/s applying restraints to competition."
New York: Mc&rax^^-Hill, 1939, p. 127.
J.M, Cla.rk, Social Control of Business , op. cit., p. 126.
"Viev^ed from another angle, competition is an exception
to the rule that no one may use his property so as to injure
another, for one is allowed to injure his competitors as
long as the injuries are merely those incidental to "legitimate
competition.
"
John Perry Miller, Unfair Competition . Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1941.
II
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It can then, in the light of the discussion above, be
truthfully said that those who claimed that the Robinsoh-Patman
Act was a restraint on competition are right.
In the sense that the Rob inson-Pat ma.n Act helps to prevent
some competitors from being overcome by competition, thereby
lessening competition to the survivors, the Act does promote
competition.
C. Back to a "Just Price"?
It is still too early to say whether the present well
developed trend towards a non-market determined price is here
to stay. We have had periods of price regulation before, and
never have been entirely free from some forms of price regulation.
Every economic crisis brings a flood of laws that attempt to
freeze price, the surface expression of deeper difficulties,
and perhaps the present epidemic may leave when the crisis
receded. Price fixing was proposed in Massachusetts in 1659 by
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John Cotton.
"Price fixing laws of the Revolutionary years may
seem to belong to the remote past, but the fact is that
for a time during those years prices of nearly every
article in general use, as well as the wages of labor,
were fixed by most of the state legislatures. This
fact is part of our heritage of governmental action,
and as such warrants mentioning. "133
See N.S.3. G-ras , "Historical Background of Modern Price
Regulation" in Business and Modern Society . Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, Edited by Malcolm McNair and H.T. Lev/is,
1938, p. 45.
Breck P. McAllister, "Price Control by Law in the United
States: A Survey" 4 Law and Contemporary Problems , od. cit.
273, at 275.
<1
99
It Is possible that we may see a reversal of the present
trend, but Copeland thinks the business man may as v:ell accustom
himeelf to regulation'^'^'^ and Gras recommends a study of the
"Just Price" of the Middle Ages, because "we see a comparable
•1 C
system growing up about us."
T 34.
"Copeland, Administration of the Robinson-Patman Act, 12
Harvard Business Reviev/
.
op, cit,
135
N.S.B.G-ras , "Modern Price Regulation, "op. cit., p. 43

100
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The Economic Significance of the Robinson-Patraan Act
The Rob in son-Patman Act, approved by the President on
June 19, 1936, has now been on the Statute Books for five years.
Seldom has any single law created so voluminous a literature.
Trade Journals issued special Robinson-Patman issues, Lega,l
and economic discussions were plentiful. The surprising thing
is that business men and attornies were unable to answer some
of the simplest questions about the application of the Law or
the effects of the Law on business problems.
To understand the reasons for this confusion is to make
considerable progress towards understanding and evaluating the
act itself. When one decides whether the Act is one to promote
Competition he has taken at least one step in tracing the irregu-
lar pattern of this Law. It is now fairly clear that the Act
belongs to the special field of regulating the plane of competi-
tion. The Act is limited to defining the type of price discrimi-
nation which shall be prohibited to both buyer and seller when
the effects of that price discrimination would give an unfair
competitive advantage to either the buyer or the seller. It is
part of the lav: regulating market practices.
Discussion of the legal aspects without the marketing aspects
of this topic is almost worthless and vice versa. The economic
background and political pressure that produced the Act are more
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Important than the words of the Act itself.
For some years, the so-called "orthodox" or "regular"
channels of distribution have met increasingly strong competition
from a new rival—the mass distributor. The mass distributor
has caused changes far beyond the amount of business he took
directly from the old-style channels because of the changes
from the former easy-going ways of the independent forced on the
little merchant by the chains' rivalry. In an atmosphere where
a resort to the law was the order of the day, the small merchant,
much more numerous than his mass distributor opponent, follov/ed
the procession of manufacturer, farmer, and laborer to the
Legislature "hat in hand" 8,nd asked for a la.w to make things
right. The Legislature attempted to do this, but the Act coming
out of the legislative mill was a product of far more than the
single Patman Bill that was intended to crimp the style of the
mass distributor by taking away the advantages of buying in quan-
tity. The Bill, as it emerged, incorporated some of the results
of years of investigations on the part of the Federal Trade
Commission, particularly its investigation of the chain store.
Because the Federal Trade Commission had found that cha.in stores
on the whole v^ere desirable institutions it vjould not subscribe
to the theory of the independents who wished to legislate them
out of business. The Federal Trade Commission' s"Final Report
on the Chain Store Investigation" had, however, found a real
abuse in certain unfair buying advantages that accrued to the
large buyer not because he was more efficient, but because he
was a better bargainer.
\
(
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The Rob inson-Patman Act was made an amendment to the Clayton
Act, vrhich, in turn, was an attempt at clarifying the practices
prohibited by the Sherman Anti-trust Law. It is written in the
la.nguage of the Lavj, not in the language of business. The business
man had heard of the Patman Bill written by the counsel of a
wholesaler' s association—a law that was frankly aimed at crippling
by political power a rival who seemed to be winning the economic
battle—but it was not the Patman Bill that had been passed by
Congress. Action on the part of the Federal Trade Commission
to v/hom the Act was entrusted for enforcement was necessary
before a reasonable interpretation vjas possible.
As case after case came before the Commission a meaning
slowly emerged. A definition of the price discrimination against
which the Act was now clearly aimed began to take shape. Trial
by cost accounting came into its ovxn only to demonstrate that
cost accounting was unfitted for the Job. A new type of analysis
of distribution costs is being developed by the Commission and
the business men coming before it. Some manufacturers who feared
that they might not be able to Justify fairly small savings in
cost found that their price structures required not the use of
a keen-edged tool but a broad axe to lop off some practices
that had "Just growed."
Some real pricing evils had developed for which there was
neither rhyme nor reason and most of these have now been partially
corrected.
(
103
The Rob inson-Patman Act has not had the effect of being any
great stumbling block in the path of the mass distributors because
it still allows differences in price where those differences repre-
sent savings in the cost of the seller's marketing changes. Because
the chains have by no means depended only on the unfair advantages
secured by their bargaining efficiency as opposed to their operat-
ing efficiency the Act has had no great bearing on the growth of
the chains. It may have an adverse effect on the very group of
independents it was meant to protect—the groups of independents
who banded together for buying purposes under the non-corporate
chains. The manufacturer so far seems to be the only clear
gainer because the pressure for extra discounts has been partly
lightened.
In some countries it is necessary to bargain for each individual
article one buys. In America this "higgling" has been largly
replaced by a one-price policy. Each customer at one particular
store at one pa,rticular time will pay the same price. This is
not true of non-retail sales. Just as the one-price policy in
retailing allows different levels of prices at different stores
and in the same store on different days (sales, etc.) so, the
adoption of a one-price policy in non-retail selling would also
allow for price changes. The non-retail seller has the additional
problem of classifying his buyers. The Robinson-Patman Act
will probably have a strong tendency towards the establishment
of a one-price policy for each individual class of buyers. This
tendency has been under way for some years but will, no doubt,
be Intensified.
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The Robinson-Patman Act represents a departure from previous
anti-trust legislation in that it substitutes the effect of
certain action as the reason for condemning that action rather
than the intent of the actors. As the Sherman Act was inter-
preted under the rule of reason, mere size or power over an
industry was no offense if that size or power had been secured
without unfair methods. In the Robinson-Patman Act some methods
heretofore considered perfectly legitimate are condemned not
because of intent but bedause the effect was believed to lead
to monopoly if that practice were unchecked.
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